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I. INTRODUCTION
In United States v. Bascaro,' defendant Antonio Bascaro, convicted
of a drug conspiracy, thought that he might have pulled a rabbit out of
his hat in his appeal to the Eleventh Circuit. He argued that his contin-
uing criminal enterprise and RICO convictions were barred by the Dou-
ble Jeopardy Clause' because they were based on conduct for which he
had already been tried and convicted in another proceeding.' Although
double jeopardy had not been raised in the district court, Bascaro might
reasonably have hoped that the Eleventh Circuit would consider the
issue under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b). Rule 52(b) per-
mits review of "plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights" for
the first time on appeal.' While the court of appeals acknowledged that
the issue might be meritorious, ' it declined to apply Rule 52(b) analysis
* Currently an Associate Appellate Counsel at, The Legal Aid Society of New
York, Criminal Appeals Bureau, Mr. Chin received his J.D. from the University of
Michigan Law School in 1988, and his B.A. from Wesleyan University in 1985. Mr.
Chin is pursuing an LL.M. degree at Yale Law School in New Haven, Connecticut. Mr.
Chin thanks James R. Carroll, Michael Dinnerstein, James B. Gunther, James J.
Moloney, and M. Kilburg Reedy for their comments.
1. 742 F.2d 1335 (l1th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1017, and cert. denied,
472 U.S. 1021 (1985).
2. "[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
3. Bascaro, 742 F.2d at 1364-65.
4. FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b).
5. Bascaro, 742 F.2d at 1365 ("If true, this state of affairs would raise a question
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and, thus, did not reverse the conviction as plain error." Instead, the
court relied on Grogan v. United States,7 which held that a double
jeopardy claim was "waived" by the failure to raise it at trial.'
While Grogan held that the double jeopardy defense was waived by
failing to raise it at trial, in another apparently similar case, McNeal v.
Hollowell,' the same court granted a writ of habeas corpus based on a
double jeopardy violation," despite the dissenting judge's argument
that the issue had not been raised in the state trial court." Even
though McNeal was decided several years after Grogan, the court in
Bascaro followed Grogan without distinguishing McNeal or explaining
why it should not be followed.
Bascaro is illustrative of the apparently insurmountable body of ad-
verse authority facing a defendant who wishes to raise a double jeopar-
dy claim for the first time on appeal. Recently, in Peretz v. United
States,2 the Supreme Court itself, citing Bascaro, suggested that dou-
ble jeopardy was barred on appeal if the defendant failed to raise the
issue at trial." Although the Supreme Court's opinion on the issue was
dicta,4 the rule that "'[tihe constitutional immunity from double jeop-
ardy is a personal right which, if not affirmatively pleaded by the defen-
dant at the time of trial, will be regarded as waived""' has been fol-
lowed by eleven circuits in scores of decisions.6 There are only a
handful of decisions opposing this mass of authority applying what this
as to the validity of Bascaro's [convictions].")
6. Id.
7. 394 F.2d 287 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 830 (1968).
8. Bascaro, 742 F.2d at 1365 (citing Grogan v. United States, 394 F.2d 287, 289
(5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 830 (1968)). The Eleventh Circuit adopted the
decisions of the former Fifth Circuit as binding precedent in Bonner v. City of
Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1207 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc).
9. 481 F.2d 1145 (5th Cir. 1973).
10. Id. at 1152.
11. Id. at 1153 (Coleman, J., dissenting).
12. 111 S. Ct. 2661 (1991).
13. Id. at 2669. As an example of the kinds of rights that could be forfeited if not
timely claimed, the Court cited Bascart', and described its holding in a parenthetical
as "absence of objection is waiver of double jeopardy defense." Id.
14. The holding of the case was that a jury could be selected by a magistrate in
the absence of an objection by the defendant. Id. at 2668-69.
15. Paul v. Henderson, 698 F.2d 589, 592 (2d Cir.) (quoting United States v. Perez,
565 F.2d 1227, 1232 (2d Cir. 1977)), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 835 (1983).
16. See infia notes 120-32, 151-60. The Fourth Circuit has only one opinion pub-
lished on the issue, finding double jeopardy reviewable for plain error. See United
States v. Jarvis, 7 F.3d 404, 412-13 (4th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1200
(1994).
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article calls the "rule of waiver."" They are few enough in number that
they may fairly be described as "derelict[s] on the waters of the law;" 8
although in the law books, like McNeal, they are routinely ignored.
The rule of waiver is a substantial disappointment to defendants who
have been subjected to double jeopardy. The remedy for a timely, meri-
torious claim of double jeopardy is dismissal of barred charges. Hence,
it is extremely consequential if it is unavailable to a defendant because
of a procedural default. In addition, a double jeopardy claim is ordinari-
ly apparent from the face of the record, cannot be cured, and repre-
sents an absolute defense, obviating the need for another trial. Thus, a
defendant could argue with some cogency that the rule of waiver is
unfair because, under the circumstances, the reasons for requiring con-
temporaneous objection apply with significantly less force.
This article examines the propriety of the federal courts' application
of the rule of waiver in light of the legal structure currently in place for
review of unobjected-to error. The rule of waiver is doctrinally
insupportable because the courts' refusal to consider and evaluate the
issue is contrary to the provisions of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure governing unobjected-to error. No court has articulated a
sound reason to depart from the rules governing analysis of unobjected-
to error. Therefore, courts should review double jeopardy claims under
the "plain error" doctrine of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b).
Part II introduces the basic substantive protections of the Double
Jeopardy Clause.'9 Part III discusses the structure established by Fed-
eral Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b) for review on appeal of errors
not objected to at trial. Part III argues further that under the standards
applicable to plain error review, a meritorious claim of double jeopardy
ordinarily constitutes plain error."
Part IV examines the reasons why a court might decline to apply the
plain error rule to double jeopardy violations and concludes that there
are no valid justifications warranting the exclusion of double jeopardy
from the system established by the Federal Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure.' Many courts have held that double jeopardy claims were
waived by a failure to follow Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12,
17. See itfra notes 13646.
18. Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 232 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
19. See infra notes 26-63 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 85-118 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 179-289 and accompanying text.
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which requires that certain motions be made before trial on pain of
waiver.' Part IV explains why Rule 12 does not apply to double jeop-
ardy claims, and thus is not a basis for a court to refuse to review a
claim.'
Part IV also explains that although many courts state, usually without
elaboration, that failure to raise a claim in the trial court constitutes a
"waiver," these courts do not apply the rigorous standards applicable to
waivers of constitutional rights which are designed to ensure a fair
trial.-" Because there is no valid reason not to apply the plain error
doctrine, Rule 52(b) is the proper governing rule of analysis for
unobjected-to double jeopardy claims on appeal.
Further, Part IV attempts to explain why courts refuse to apply Rule
52(b) to double jeopardy claims. Two reasons appear to account for the
courts' treatment of double jeopardy claims. First, the courts often
seem unaware of their own precedents and those of the Supreme
Court. Although courts of appeals customarily consider themselves
bound by decisions of prior panels on the same legal issue, in this con-
text many panels have failed to follow, or even acknowledge, prior
circuit authority. Moreover, while it is unusual for a panel to reach a
decision contrary to an applicable Supreme Court decision without
some attempt at an explanation, numerous appellate courts have held
that a double jeopardy claim is waived if not raised, without acknowl-
edging Supreme Court authority to the contrary. In fact, the Court has
expressly recognized that double jeopardy is a constitutional claim that
can only be waived knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently."
Second, most of these lower court opinions can be explained by the
rule that a court will address a double jeopardy claim raised for the
first time on appeal when it is meritorious, regardless of any waiver
principle. When the claim is not meritorious, however, the court will
usually find that the claim is waived because it was not raised below,
and then proceed to analyze the claim on the merits, explaining why it
does not succeed. The problem with this approach is that some courts,
as illustrated in Bascaro, apply the rule of waiver literally and refuse to
consider meritorious claims. In addition, courts may review such claims
less carefully than if the point had not been deemed waived.
This article argues that, contrary to near-unanimous belief, double
jeopardy claims are reviewable as plain error even when raised for the
22. See i-nfra notes 179-84, 201 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 184-247 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 248-89 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 253-79 and accompanying text.
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first time on appeal, and, when meritorious, such claims are, indeed,
plain error.
II. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in
pertinent part: "[Nior shall any person be subject for the same offence
to be twice placed in jeopardy of life or limb."" The rationale for the
prohibition against more than one prosecution for the same offense was
set forth by the Supreme Court in Green v. United States:
21
The underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo-American
system of jurisprudence, is that the State with all its resources and power should
not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged
offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and com-
pelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as en-
hancing the possibility that even though innocent he may be found guilty.'
The Double Jeopardy Clause is also designed to deny the prosecution
an unfair tactical advantage by having a "practice" trial at which it can
learn the defense's case. "'[Clentral to the objective of the prohibition
against successive trials' is the barrier to 'affording the prosecution an-
other opportunity to supply evidence which it failed to muster during the
first proceeding."'' "Implicit in this is the thought that if the Govern-
ment may reprosecute, it gains an advantage from what it learns at the
first trial about the strengths of the defense case and the weaknesses of
26. U.S. CONsT. amend. V. There are a number of sources that provide a more de-
tailed discussion of the substantive law of double jeopardy than is possible here. See,
e.g., 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, § 17.4 & ch. 24
(West 1984 & Supp. 1991) [hereinafter LAFAVE & ISRAEL]; Twenty-77tird Annual Re-
view of Criminal Procedure: United States Supreme Court and Court Of Appeals,
1992-93, Double Jeopardy, 82 GEO. L.J. 962-1005 (1994); Note, Twice in Jeopardy, 75
YALE L. J. 262 (1965). For explanations of the theories behind the clause and ratio-
nalizations of Supreme Court decisions, see Peter Westen & Richard Drubel, Toward
A General Theory of Double Jeopardy, 1978 SUP. CT. REV. 81 (1978) and George C.
Thomas, III, An Elegant Theor-y of Double Jeopardy, 1988 U. ILL. L. REV. 827 (1988).
For the history of the double jeopardy doctrine, refer to JAY A. SIGLER. DOUBLE JEOP-
ARDY, TlE DEVELOPMENT OF A LEGAL AND SOCIAL POLICY (1969), and MARTIN L.
FRIEDLAND, DOUBLE JEOPARDY (1969).
27. 355 U.S. 184 (1957).
28. Id. at 187-88.
29. United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 128 (1980) (quoting Burks v. United
States, 437 U.S. 1, 11 (1978)); see also Swisher v. Brady, 438 U.S. 204, 215-16 (1978).
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its own."' Once a trial begins, the clause also protects a defendant's
right to have her trial completed by the tribunal that she had a role in
selecting."
Because the Double Jeopardy Clause is "'fundamental to the American
scheme of justice,"' it has been applied to the states through the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.' However, the states and
the United States are considered "separate sovereigns" and, thus, the
Double Jeopardy Clause does not prohibit prosecution by one sovereign
following prosecution by the other.' Nevertheless, a state and one of its
political subdivisions are considered to be the same sovereign for double
jeopardy purposes.'
A. The Prohibition Against Successive Prosecutions for the
Same Offense
The Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits the government from prosecut-
ing a defendant in a second proceeding, unless the defendant himself
upsets the finality of the first proceeding." Thus, a person may not be
30. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 128 (1980) (citing United States v. Scott, 437 U.S.
82, 105 n.4 (1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting) and United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332,
352 (1975)).
31. Cfist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 36 (1978).
32. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969) (quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 391
U.S. 145, 149 (1968)).
33. Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 88-89 (1985); accord United States v. Wheeler,
435 U.S. 313, 316-17 (1978). For recent criticism of the rule, see Daniel A. Braun,
Praying to False Sovereigns: The Rule Permitting Successive Prosecutions in the Age
of Cooperative Federalism, 20 AM. J. dRIM. L. 1 (1992).
34. Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387, 392, 394-95 (1970) (holding that the defendant
could not be tried by both the state of Florida and a municipality for the same of-
fense).
35. Jeopardy attaches in a bench trial when the court begins to hear evidence,
Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377, 388 (1975), and in a jury trial, jeopardy atta-
ches when the jury is sworn. See, e.g., Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 38 (1978);
Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734 (1963). Double jeopardy is not limited to sec-
ond trials; it includes any further fact-finding proceedings intended to determine ele-
ments of the offense. Smalis v. Pennsylvania, 476 U.S. 140, 14546 (1986). Jeopardy is
generally limited to criminal proceedings. See, e.g., Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391,
398-99 (1938). However, a civil penalty may give rise to jeopardy if it is so dispropor-
tionate that it "cannot fairly be said solely to serve a remedial purpose, but rather
can only be explained as also serving either retributive or deterrent purposes." United
States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 448 (1989). A juvenile court prosecution, although
nominally civil, may place a defendant in jeopardy because the consequences are
similar or identical to those of a criminal prosecution. See, e.g., Breed v. Jones, 421
U.S. 519, 529-31 (1975).
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prosecuted again following an acquittal' or a conviction. 7 Repros-
ecution is prohibited following a mistrial unless the mistrial was declared
for "manifest necessity,"' or with the consent of,5 or at the request
of,4 the defendant. Likewise, a defendant may be retried if he success-
fully appeals or otherwise overturns the conviction4' unless the convic-
tion is reversed for evidentiary insufficiency.
2
The Double Jeopardy Clause may also bar successive prosecution of a
defendant even when the second proceeding does not charge the defen-
dant with precisely the sante crime as the first.4' For example, in Brown
v. Ohio," the Court held that the defendant could not be prosecuted for
the greater offense of auto theft after being convicted of the lesser-in-
cluded offense of joyriding involving the same facts."' Similarly, the
36. Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54, 64 (1978); United States v. Martin Linen
Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 571 (1977); United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 669-71
(1896). An acquittal is "a resolution, correct or not, of some or all of the factual ele-
ments of the offense charged" in favor of the defendant. Martin Linen, 430 U.S. at
571. If a defendant is convicted of a lesser offense than the highest offense charged,
the defendant is impliedly acquitted of the higher charges. Green v. United States,
355 U.S. 184, 190-91 (1957). If no further factual proceedings are necessary, a trial
judge's finding of insufficiency following a jury's guilty verdict may be reviewed. Unit-
ed States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 352-53 (1975).
37. Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1. 9 (1978).
38. Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 462-63 (1973); United States v. Perez, 22
U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579 (1824). A common basis for a "manifest necessity" mistrial is a
hung jury, as in Perez. Id. A retrial is permitted following a manifest necessity mistri-
al even if the evidence at the initial trial was insufficient to convict the defendant.
Richardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317, 322-26 (1984).
39. United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 608-11 (1976).
40. United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 93-94 (1978). Cf. Oregon v. Kennedy, 456
U.S. 667, 679 (1982) (explaining that a mistrial requested by the defendant precludes
retrial where the prosecution provoked the defendant into moving for the mistrial).
41. United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 468 (1964).
42. Hudson v. Louisiana, 450 U.S. 40, 4245 (1981); Burks v. United States, 437 U.S.
1, 11 (1978). Reprosecution is permitted, however, if the appeals court reverses the
conviction based on the weight of the evidence as a "thirteenth juror" rather than for
legal evidentiary insufficiency. Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 42 (1982). In addition,
the Double Jeopardy Clause does not prevent retrial "where the evidence offered by
the State and admitted by the trial court-whether erroneously or not-would have
been sufficient to sustain a guilty verdict." Lockhart v. Nelson, 488 U.S. 33, 34 (1988).
43. Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 168-69 (1977).
44. Id.
45. Id. at 167-68; see also Morris v. Mathews, 475 U.S. 237 (1986) (agreeing with
the lower court that trial of defendant for aggravated murder where aggravating fac-
tor was a robbery for which defendant had already been convicted violated the Dou-
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clause prohibits a subsequent prosecution for a lesser-included offense
once there is a conviction on the greater offense."
In determining whether two charges constitute the same offense under
the Double Jeopardy Clause, a court applies the test set forth in
Blockburger v. United States,47 and examines whether "each provision
requires proof of a fact which the other does not."48 If each charge re-
quires proof of an element that the other does not, the offenses are not
the same and, thus, separate trials or cumulative punishments are not
barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause."
B. The Prohibition Against Multiple Punishments
for the Same Offense
The Double Jeopardy Clause also prohibits multiple punishments for
the same offense.' To the extent that the multiple punishments are im-
posed in multiple proceedings, the prohibition on multiple punishments
overlaps with the prohibition on multiple trials. The prohibition also
applies when the punishments are imposed in a single proceeding.' Mul-
ble Jeopardy Clause); Grafton v. United States, 206 U.S. 333, 348-50 (1907) (holding
that the acquittal of lesser offense of homicide precluded prosecution of greater of-
fense of assassination).
46. Payne v. Virginia, 468 U.S. 1062, 1062 (1984) (per curiam) (holding that con-
viction of felony murder precluded later prosecution for underlying felony of rob-
bery); Harris v. Oklahoma, 433 U.S. 682, 682-83 (1977) (per curiam) (holding that con-
viction of felony murder precluded later prosecution for robbery with firearms); ex
parte Nielsen, 131 U.S. 176, 190 (1889) (holding that a conviction for unlawful cohabi-
tation precluded second prosecution for adultery).
47. 284 U.S. 299 (1932).
48. Id. at 304 (citing Gavieres v. United States, 220 U.S. 338, 342 (1911)).
49. Id. (citing Gavieres, 220 U.S. at 342 (quoting Morey v. Commonwealth, 108
Mass. 433, 443 (1871)) ("A single act may be an offense against two statutes; and if
each statute requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not, an acquit-
tal or conviction under either statute does not exempt the defendant from prosecu-
tion and punishment under the other."). For a short period of time, it was necessary
to meet an additional test called the Grady "same conduct" test. Grady v. Corbin,
495 U.S. 508, 521 (1990), overruled by United States v. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. 2849 (1993).
In Grady, the Supreme Court held that "the Double Jeopardy Clause bars any subse-
quent prosecution in which the government, to establish an essential element of an
offense charged in that prosecution, will prove conduct that constitutes an offense for
which the defendant has already been prosecuted." Id. In particular, the court held
that a prior prosecution for reckless driving prohibited a prosecution for manslaugh-
ter where the reckless driving would be used to prove the homicide. Under the tradi-
tional Blockburger test, the offenses would not have constituted a "single offense"
because each required proof of an element that the other did not. Id. at 510, 515-16.
Subsequently, Grady was overruled by United States v. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. 2849 (1993).
50. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969), overried in part on other
grounds by Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794, 795 (1989).
51. See, e.g., Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 168-69 (1977) (holding that the Double
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tiple punishments for the same offense can result from a "multiplicitous"
indictment. 2 Multiplicity is defined as "the charging of a single offense
in more than one count. " '
Multiplicity may occur in one of two forms: legal or factual. Under
Blockburger, when an act violates two or more federal statutes, courts
presume that Congress did not intend separate punishments and convic-
tions, unless each statute requires proof of a fact that the other does
not.' Thus, legal multiplicity occurs when a defendant is convicted un-
der two separate statutes for conduct that the legislature did not intend
to result in separate convictions.' Factual multiplicity, on the other
hand, arises when a defendant is convicted of multiple violations of a
statute based on facts constituting a single violation.' This problem fre-
Jeopardy Clause prohibits cumulative punishment for greater and lesser included of-
fenses even if both are imposed in the same proceeding).
52. See, e.g., United States v. Hord, 6 F.3d 276, 280 (5th Cir. 1993) (citing United
States v. Lemons, 941 F.2d 309, 317 (5th Cir. 1991) (per curiam)); United States v.
Reed, 639 F.2d 896, 904 (2d Cir. 1981) (finding that the danger of multiplicitous in-
dictment is that "it may lead to multiple sentences for the same offense").
53. United States v. De La Torre, 634 F.2d 792, 794 (5th Cir. 1981); accord United
States v. Hairrell, 521 F.2d 1264, 1266 (6th Cir.) (holding that the charges of posses-
sion of counterfeit money and transfer of same are not multiplicitous, but separate
offenses), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1035 (1975); see also United States v. Kazenbach, 824
F.2d 649, 651-52 (8th Cir. 1987) (holding that indictment not multiplicitous where
defendant convicted of three assaults, each of which was based on a separate act
despite arising out of a single altercation).
54. See Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 340 (1981) (stating that "[tihe
Blockburger test is a 'rule of statutory construction'" which "serves as a means of
discerning congressional purpose"); Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 692 (1980)
("[W]here two statutory provisions proscribe the 'same offense,' they are construed to
authorize cumulative punishments in the absence of a clear indication of contrary
legislative intent"); see also lanelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 785 n.17 (1975) (de-
scribing the Blockburger test as a means of "identifying congressional intent to im-
pose separate sanctions for multiple offenses arising in the course of a single act or
transaction").
55. See, e.g., Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856, 862 (1985) (finding that absent
specific congressional intent, felon could not be convicted of both receiving a firearm
and possessing a firearm under two separate firearm statutes). This form of multi-
plicity could arise when the charged count is a lesser-included offense of another
crime.
56. This problem is often referred to as determining the appropriate "unit of prose-
cution." United States v. Song, 934 F.2d 105, 108 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding that indict-
ment charging violations of 18 U.S.C. § 2320, which prohibits trafficking in counterfeit
goods, was not multiplicitous because "unit of prosecution" was trafficking in each
counterfeit trademark, not trafficking in counterfeit goods in general). For instance,
1169
quently arises when the government attempts to divide a single conspira-
cy into several smaller conspiracies in order to increase the number of
counts in the prosecution. 7
Multiple punishment for the same offense can also occur when a per-
son is convicted of an offense, gets the conviction set aside, and is later
reconvicted and resentenced. The defendant must then be given credit
for time served under the original judgment; otherwise, he could serve
more time than the sentence imposes and, possibly more time than is
authorized by statute.'
C. Other Protections of the Double Jeopardy Clause
The Double Jeopardy Clause provides some collateral estoppel protec-
tion. In Ashe v. Swenson,' the Court held that the doctrine of collateral
estoppel, familiar from the civil law, had some application in the criminal
context: "[W]hen an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a
valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the
same parties in any future lawsuit."" However, if it is unclear whether a
particular issue was decided in defendant's favor, collateral estoppel will
not apply.6'
the Court has held that cohabitation with more than one woman was a continuing
offense, and, therefore, it was improper to convict the defendant of three separate
counts for a single continuous episode. In re Snow, 120 U.S. 274, 285 (1887). See
also United States v. Eaves, 877 F.2d 943, 947 (l1th Cir. 1989) (finding conviction of
two counts of Hobbs Act violation improper where two payments were installments
of single lump sum), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1077 (1990); United States v. Osunegbu,
822 F.2d 472, 481 (5th Cir. 1987) (finding conviction of two counts of possession of
stolen mail improper because both packages were stolen at the same time and, thus,
constitute only a single offense).
57. Braverman v. United States, 317 U.S. 49, 53-54 (1942) (holding that a single
conspiracy to commit several substantive offenses should result in only one convic-
tion); United States v. Gomez-Pabon, 911 F.2d 847, 860-61 (1st Cir. 1990) (finding that
the lower court erred by imposing sentence under two counts for a single conspir-
acy), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 801 (1991); United States v. Keinzle, 896 F.2d 326, 328
(8th Cir. 1990) (stating that the Double Jeopardy Clause "prohibits the subdivision of
a single conspiracy into multiple violations of one conspiracy statute") (citing
Braverman); United States v. Cerro, 775 F.2d 908, 913 (7th Cir. 1985); United States
v. Peacock, 761 F.2d 1313, 1319 (9th Cir.) (Kennedy, J.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 847
(1985).
58. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717-19 (1969), overruled in part on
other grounds by Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794, 795 (1989).
59. 397 U.S. 436 (1970).
60. Id. at 443; see also Turner v. Arkansas, 407 U.S. 366 (1972) (per curiam). Col-
lateral estoppel does not run against a defendant in a subsequent criminal proceed-
ing. Simpson v. Florida, 403 U.S. 384, 386 (1971) (per curiam).
61. Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 348-49 (1990) (finding that collateral
estoppel is not available where defendant failed to show that issue was actually de-
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The Double Jeopardy Clause generally does not prohibit an increase in
a sentence on appeal or retrial.' However, a penalty phase determina-
tion in a capital case that the defendant should be sentenced to life im-
prisonment is binding upon reconviction.'
III. "PLAIN ERROR": REVIEW IN THE COURTS OF APPEALS OF ERRORS
RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL
It is an ancient rule that for an error to be cognizable on appeal in the
federal courts, it must have been properly objected to at trial.' The ex-
ception to this rule, which is just as old, is that an appellate court, in its
discretion, may choose to review an error despite a failure to object be-
low.' In United States v. Atkinson,' the Court stated the principle as
follows: "In exceptional circumstances, especially in criminal cases, ap-
pellate courts, in the public interest, may, of their own motion, notice er-
rors to which no exception has been taken, if the errors are obvious, or
if they otherwise seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputa-
tion of judicial proceedings."7
cided in his favor in the first proceeding; collateral estoppel did not bar use of
crimes for which defendant was acquitted as prior bad act evidence because only a
preponderance is required to show prior bad act); see also One Lot Emerald Cut
Stones v. United States, 409 U.S. 232, 235 (1972) (per curiam) (finding that acquittal
in criminal trial did not bar forfeiture proceeding because of lower standard of proof
for forfeiture).
62. United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117 (1980); North Carolina v. Pearce,
395 U.S. 711, 719-23 (1969), overruled in part on other grounds by Alabama v Smith,
490 U.S. 794, 795 (1989). The Due Process Clause does provide some protection.
however, from punishments that are vindictively increased as a result of a successful
appeal. See Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 27-29 (1974); Pearce, 395 U.S. at 723-26.
63. Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430, 446 (1981). Double jeopardy is not vio-
lated by imposition of a death sentence following a jury recommendation of life im-
prisonment that under state law is non-binding. Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 465
(1984). Moreover, at a penalty-phase hearing in a capital case, evidence of crimes for
which a defendant has already been prosecuted may be admitted without violating
the Double Jeopardy Clause. Schiro v. Farley, 114 S. Ct. 783 (1994).
64. See, e.g., Ross v. Reed, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 482, 483 (1816).
65. In two early cases, Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch)
64, 123 (1804) and Himley v. Rose, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 312, 315 (1809), the Court
reviewed errors apparent in the record despite the absence of proper exceptions.
66. 297 U.S. 157 (1936).
67. Id. at 160 (citing New York Cent. R.R. Co. v. Johnson, 279 U.S. 310, 318
(1929); Brasfield v. United States, 272 U.S. 448, 450 (1926)).
When the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure were adopted in 1944,
the common law structure was retained.'5 Rule 51 abolished the necessi-
ty of formal "exceptions" and stated that "it is sufficient that a party, at
the time the ruling or order of the court is made or sought, makes
known to the court the action that party desires the court to take or that
party's objection to the action of the court and the grounds therefor."'
Thus, Rule 51 retained the requirement that parties affirmatively object
to events they believe are error, and affirmatively request actions they
wish the court to take.7
Rule 52 retained a means for review of serious errors even if the de-
fendant failed to properly preserve them.7' Rule 52 provides:
Rule 52. Harmless Error And Plain Error.
(a) Harmless Error. Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not
affect substantial rights shall be disregarded.
(b) Plain Error. Plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be no-
ticed although they were not brought to the attention of the court. '
Rule 52 is mandatory; absent some other binding rule, federal courts are
not free to impose a different test.'
Therefore, defendants are required to make objections to defects and
errors in the district court." Where a defendant fails to make a timely
objection, absent some valid excuse,7 ' review will be limited to the rig-
68. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b) advisory committee's note.
69. FED. R. CRIM. P. 51.
70. See, e.g., United States v. Terry, 729 F.2d 1063, 1069 (6th Cir. 1984) ("A de-
fendant is required to object to the action of the trial court in order to preserve an
alleged error for appellate review.") (citing, inter alia, Rule 51).
71. According to the advisory committee's note, Rule 52(b) "is a restatement of
existing law." FED. R. CRiM. P. 52(b) advisory committee's note (citing Wiborg v.
United States, 163 U.S. 632 (1896); Hemphill v. United States, 112 F.2d 505 (9th Cir.
1940), rev'd on other grounds, 312 U.S. 657 (1941)).
72. FED. R. CRIM. P. 52.
73. See Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250, 255 (1988) (holding
district court improperly dismissed indictment as a sanction for grand jury miscon-
duct that constituted harmless error under Rule 52(a); "Rule 52 is, in every pertinent
respect, as binding as any statute duly enacted by Congress and federal courts have
no more discretion to disregard the Rule's mandate than they do to disregard consti-
tutional or statutory provisions").
74. See United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 15 (1985) (noting "contemporaneous ob-
jection requirement"); United States v. Vontsteen, 950 F.2d 1086, 1089-90 (5th Cir.) (en
banc) (explaining the reasons for the contemporaneous objection rule), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 3039 (1992).
75. Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 51 provides, in pertinent part, that "if a
party has no opportunity to object to a ruling or order, the absence of an bbjection
does not thereafter prejudice that party." FED. R. CalM. P. 51. See also United States
v. Flores-Payon, 942 F.2d 556, 558 (9th Cir. 1991) (commenting that contemporaneous
objection may be excused when there has been a change in the law since the trial);
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orous plain error standard of Rule 52(b), which requires that the error
be "particularly egregious."'
In the recent case of United States v. Olano,8 the Supreme Court de-
fined the trial events that may constitute plain error. First, the Court
explained that there must be an error, which the Court defined as a
"[dleviation from a legal rule. "' Second, the error must be "plain,"
which the Court described as synonymous with "clear" or "obvious."'
Third, the Court stated that the error must "affect substantial rights,"
which "in most cases .. means that the error must have been
prejudicial: It must have affected the outcome of the District Court pro-
ceedings."" The Court also recognized that "[tihere may be a special
Guam v. Yang, 850 F.2d 507, 512 n.8 (9th Cir. 1988) (en banc) (stating that contem-
poraneous objection may be excused when an objection would have been futile be-
cause of binding circuit authority); United States v. Valentine, 820 F.2d 565, 571 (2d
Cir. 1987) (stating that contemporaneous objection may be excused when defense
counsel had no way of knowing about the error at the time).
76. Each of the courts of appeals has stated some formulation of the concept that
the failure to object will limit appellate review to plain error. See FED. R. CRIM. P.
52(b); United States v. McLamb, 985 F.2d 1284, 1288 (4th Cir. 1993) ("Because
McLamb failed to raise these objections at trial, we review the jury instructions
against the background of the entire record for plain error prejudicing substantial
constitutional rights"); United States v. Neely, 980 F.2d 1074, 1082 (7th Cir. 1992)
("Because [defendant] did not argue at trial that his letter was not hearsay, we can-
not consider that error absent plain error"); United States v. Hegwood, 977 F.2d 492,
495 (9th Cir. 1992) (In the absence of contemporaneous defense objection, a court
will review claim only for plain error), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2348 (1993); United
States v. Greenwood, 974 F.2d 1449, 1462 (5th Cir. 1992) (same), ceart. denied. 113 S.
Ct. 2354 (1993); United States v. Harmas, 974 F.2d 1262, 1267 (lth Cir. 1992) (same);
United States v. Carter, 973 F.2d 1509, 1512 (10th Cir. 1992) (same), cert. denied, 113
U.S. 1289 (1993); United States v. Panet-Collazo, 960 F.2d 256, 260 (1st Cir.) (same),
cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 220 (1992), and cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2417 (1993); United
States v. Leo, 941 F.2d 181, 193 (3d Cir. 1991) (same); United States v. Torres, 901
F.2d 205, 207 (2d Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 906 (1990); United States v.
Hitow, 889 F.2d 1573, 1580 (6th Cir. 1989) (same); United States v. Capozzi, 883 F.2d
608, 612 n.8 (8th Cir. 1989) (same), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 918 (1990); United States v.
Perholtz, 842 F.2d 343, 362 (D.C. Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 821 (1988).
77. FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b); United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 163 (1982).
78. 113 S. Ct. 1770 (1993).
79. Id. at 1777.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 1777-78.
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category of forfeited errors that can be corrected regardless of their
effect on the outcome" but did not identify what kind of errors those
might be.'
If a defendant demonstrates each of these requirements, then the court
of appeals has the discretion to reach an issue even though no objection
was properly raised."' The court may exercise its discretion based on
whether and to what extent the error "seriously affect[s] the fairness,
integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings,"' independent of
the defendant's actual innocence.
If Rule 52(b) analysis is applicable, then, even in the absence of an
objection, meritorious claims of violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause
would ordinarily be plain error subject to review by a court of appeal. '
A double jeopardy claim, to be reviewable on appeal, will be apparent
from the face of the record; in other words, it will be plain, clear, and
obvious. ' Furthermore, a valid double jeopardy claim will always have
affected the outcome in the district court. As one court explained, "[i]t is
difficult to imagine an error capable of more drastically affecting the out-
come of judicial proceedings than permitting the Government to obtain a
conviction for an offense whose prosecution was barred ab initio by the
constitutional guarantee of freedom from being 'twice in jeopardy of life
or limb."'' 7
Several other factors applied by the courts of appeals in determining
whether to exercise their discretion indicate that double jeopardy claims
should be reviewed for plain error. As many circuits have noted, plain er-
ror is found more readily when the error is constitutional. ' A conviction
82. Id. at 1778.
83. Id. at 1778-79.
84. Id. at 1779 (quoting United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160 (1936)).
85. See, e.g., United States v. Jarvis, 7 F.3d 404, 412 (4th Cir. 1993), cert. denied,
114 S. Ct. 1200 (1994).
86. Id. ("[It is abundantly 'clear under current law,' that multiple prosecutions
which run afoul of the Double Jeopardy Clause are constitutionally forbidden.").
87. Id. at 413 (citing U.S. CONST. amend. V); see also United States v. Podell, 869
F.2d 328, 331-32 (7th Cir. 1989) (finding prosecution of multiplicitous indictments
plain error).
88. See United States v. Jefferson, 925 F.2d 1242, 1254 (10th Cir.) ("We will ...
apply the plain error rule less rigidly when reviewing a potential constitutional er-
ror."), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 238 (1991); United States v. Lopez, 923 F.2d 47, 50
(5th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2032 (1991); United States v. Torres. 901
F.2d 205, 228 (2d Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 906 (1990); United States v.
Shue, 766 F.2d 1122, 1132 (7th Cir. 1985) (same); United States v. Smith. 700 F.2d
627, 633 (11th Cir. 1983) (same); United States v. Tobias, 662 F.2d 381, 388 (5th Cir.
1981) (same), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1108 (1982); United States v. Brown, 555 F.2d
407, 420 (5th Cir. 1977) (same), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 904 (1978); United States v.
Lopez, 414 F.2d 272, 273 (2d Cir. 1969) (per curiam) (same); Alexander v. United
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obtained in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause results from the
most significant kind of constitutional error. In one context, however,
the Supreme Court has indicated that a violation of the Double Jeopardy
Clause cannot be harmless error.'
Perhaps constitutional errors are more readily corrected even if
unobjected to at trial because the Constitution embodies particularly
fundamental and important principles. One constitutional value that will
be promoted by reviewing unpreserved double jeopardy claims is the
accuracy of the fact-finding process. An appellate dismissal cannot re-
coup for the defendant the costs and anxiety caused by a prosecution
that should not have occurred. Nevertheless, the Double Jeopardy Clause
contemplates that such anxiety and expense, as well as the knowledge
gained by the government during the first prosecution, will amplify "the
possibility that even the innocent ... may be found guilty."' Therefore,
courts should be willing to reverse convictions obtained in violation of
double jeopardy because those convictions are more likely to pertain to
defendants who were convicted as the result of a miscarriage of justice
than to defendants who were convicted after a single trial. In holding
that a double jeopardy violation constituted plain error, one court has
stated that "[wle cannot imagine a course more likely to 'seriously affect
the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings,' than
States, 390 F.2d 101, 103 n.3 (5th Cir. 1968) (same); see also United States v. Miller,
468 F.2d 1041, 104445 (4th Cir. 1972) (finding violation of constitutional right to jury
trial constituted plain error), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 935 (1973).
89. In Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323 (1970), the defendant was acquitted of mur-
der in his first trial but convicted of the lesser included offense of manslaughter. He
won a new trial on appeal, and was retried for murder, and again convicted of man-
slaughter. The Supreme Court held that the implied acquittal of murder in the first
trial precluded a second prosecution of murder, and therefore, he should not have
been tried again for murder. Id. at 329. Although he was convicted only of man-
slaughter, a count not barred by double jeopardy, the Court rejected the argument
that the error could be harmless under the harmless error doctrine of Chapman v.
California. Id. at 330 (citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967)). The Arice
Court held that most constitutional errors do not require reversal if the prosecution
can show that they were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. In doing so the Court
reasoned: "[W]e cannot determine whether or not the murder charge against petition-
er induced the jury to find him guilty of the less serious charge of voluntary man-
slaughter rather than to continue to debate his innocence." Id. at 331.
90. Green v. United States. 355 U.S. 184, 188 (1957). One commentator states: "In
many cases, an innocent person will not have the stamina or resources effectively to
fight a second charge." MARTIN FRIEDLAND, DOUBLE JEOPARDY at 4 (1969).
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for us to permit [defendant's] ... conviction, obtained in such flagrant
violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause, to stand.""1
While the adverse effects of multiple prosecutions on the defendant
may be impossible to prove in any given case, there will undoubtedly be
at least one significant blunder by trial counsel in each case where a
meritorious double jeopardy violation is presented initially on appeal: the
failure to raise the double jeopardy claim itself. Neither a defendant nor
his attorney would ever intentionally fail to raise a meritorious claim of
double jeopardy as part of a defense strategy. 2 As the Seventh Circuit
explained in United States v. Anderson,' "[a] double jeopardy defense
is normally not the type of claim that would be foregone for some strate-
gic purpose."' According to the Second Circuit, "[a] defendant would
have to be foolish not to raise a known claim of former jeopardy that
would be sufficient to secure the dismissal of the entire proceeding."")
No court has advanced a plausible strategic reason for a defendant to
forego a meritorious double jeopardy claim. In Ochoa v. Estelle, the
district court for the Western District of Texas found that a defendant
might hold back a double jeopardy claim as what might be termed an
"ace in the hole." 7 The court refused to consider a double jeopardy
claim raised after trial because to do so "would allow the defendant a
free shot at an acquittal at the second trial but, failing that, a certain
reversal of the conviction in a later collateral proceeding."' Professor
Saltzburg has offered a compelling explanation for why the costs and
risks of going to trial could not constitute a "free shot" at an acquittal.'
91. United States v. Jarvis, 7 F.3d 404, 413 (4th Cir. 1993) (quoting United States
v. Olano, 113 S. Ct. 1770, 1779 (1993)), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1200 (1994).
92. A defendant might forego a known, meritorious double jeopardy defense for
reasons other than trying to win the case. In some rare circumstances, a defendant
might be willing to brave a trial to get a jury's verdict of acquittal for some reason
of principle. Alternatively, a defendant might be willing to plead guilty to a jeopardy-
barred count as part of a plea bargain disposing of other charges.
93. 514 F.2d 583 (7th Cir. 1975).
94. Id. at 586; see also United States v. Broce, 781 F.2d 792, 802 (10th Cir. 1986)
(Seymour, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part from en banc decision) (quot-
ing Anderson, 514 F.2d at 586), rev'd on other grounds, 488 U.S. 563 (1989); United
States v. Spears, 671 F.2d 991, 993 (7th Cir. 1982) (quoting Anderson, 514 F.2d at
586).
95. United States ex rel. DiGiangiemo v. Regan, 528 F.2d 1262, 1270 (2d Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 426 U.S. 950 (1976).
96. 445 F. Supp. 1076 (W.D. Tex. 1976).
97. Id. at 1081-82.
98. Id. at 1082.
99. Stephen A. Saltzburg, Pleas Of Guilty And The Loss Of Constitutional Rights:
The Current Price Of Pleading Guilty, 76 MICli. L. REV. 1265, 1295-96 (1978). Profes-
sor Saltzburg explained how the Ochoa decision was wrong in claiming that holding
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In addition, the Supreme Court has rejected the notion that a defendant
or attorney might waive a meritorious and absolute defense at trial in the
hopes of achieving a victory on collateral review."° A defendant would
back on a double jeopardy claim gave a defendant a "free shot" at an acquittal:
In many instances, a defendant who goes to trial hardly receives a free shot
at acquittal. If the defendant pays for his counsel, the costs associated with a
trial are likely to be greater than the costs of raising a double jeopardy
claim by motion before trial. If the defendant cannot secure release pending
his trial, the various discomforts of jail and the loss of wages and opportuni-
ties combine to make the choice to undertake a trial rather than to file a
pre-trial motion more onerous than simply a "free shot." Also, the defendant
who proceeds to trial risks a sentence that may be considerably higher than
the one attaching to a guilty plea. Unless the defendant knows with certainty
that any conviction will be overturned on appeal, he assumes the risk that
an unsuccessful double jeopardy claim will leave a higher sentence in effect.
Moreover he may begin to serve the sentence while making the collateral
attack. This is no small price for going to trial.
Id.
In addition, the Ochoa decision implicitly relies on the notion that an acquittal is
somehow more desirable than another form of disposition in favor of a defendant.
Many defendants would likely find the difference immaterial; even for white-collar crim-
inals, who presumably have a greater interest in middle-class respectability than rapists
or drug dealers, there appears to be little difference between a technical victory and
an acquittal. According to the New York Times, for example, Lt. Col. Oliver North
claimed that he was "totally exonerated" after his conviction was reversed and the
indictment dismissed. Oliver North Beats the Rap, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 1991, at A20;
see also Judge In Iran-Contra Trial Drops Case Against North After Prosecutor Gives
Up, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 1991, at Al (North "declared that he felt 'fully, completely'
vindicated."). North got the full public relations benefit of a disposition in his favor
even though his victory was premised on errors having little to do with guilt or inno-
cence. See United States v. North, 910 F.2d 843 (D.C. Cir.), granting rehearing in part
and denying in part, 920 F.2d 940 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (en banc); see also DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 145(c) (1991 & Supp. 1992) ("To the extent that a director, officer, em-
ployee or agent of a corporation has been successful on the merits or othervise in
defense of any action, suit or proceeding . . . he shall be indemnified against expens-
es . . . .") (emphasis added). Moreover, any notion that a person would voluntarily go
to trial likewise applies to claims of being tried twice, because even a person who
desired an acquittal on principle would presumably have no objection to being tried
only once on a technically correct (i.e., non-multiplicitous) indictment.
100. Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 382 n.7 (1986). The Court found it un-
likely that defense attorneys would sandbag a meritorious Fourth Amendment sup-
pression claim, hoping to raise the issue as an ineffective assistance of counsel claim
on collateral review:
[Clounsel's client has little, if anything, to gain and everything to lose
through such a strategy. It should be remembered that the only incompetent-
ly litigated and defaulted Fourth Amendment claims that could lead to a
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also be unlikely to sandbag a meritorious double jeopardy claim because
the burden of proof is much more difficult under plain error review than
when the claim is timely raised."0 '
In a Seventh Circuit case, United States v. Griffin, 2 the court sug-
gested that a defendant might withhold a multiplicity claim until after
conviction in the hope that evidence might be destroyed after the convic-
tion but before the appeal was decided.' ° The court hypothesized a sit-
uation where a defendant possesses two separate quantities of narcotics,
one in his pants pocket and one in his car, but contends that there was
only a single possession and, thus, a single offense."l The court stated
that the prosecution's response would be to argue that because the drugs
were stored in separate places, the defendant was not in continuous
possession of both packages at the same time, and further, that the sepa-
rate packages might contain drugs of different purity. °' The court rea-
soned that "[i]f the defendant were allowed to raise a multiplicity argu-
ment at any time after trial, the drugs would in all probability have been
destroyed and the Government would have lost the factual basis for
reversal of the defendant's conviction on Sixth Amendment grounds are po-
tentially outcome-determinative claims. No reasonable lawyer would forego
competent litigation of meritorious, possibly decisive claims on the remote
chance that his deliberate dereliction might ultimately result in federal habeas
review.
Id.
The Court also noted that in contrast to an ineffectiveness claim raised later on
collateral reviewthe burden of proof was less difficult to satisfy where the suppression
claim is timely raised. Id.
101. The general rule is that once the defendant has timely demonstrated a
nonfrivolous claim of double jeopardy, the burden shifts to the government to show
there is no violation. See, e.g., United States v. Garcia, 919 F.2d 881. 886 (3d Cir.
1990) ("[A] defendant has the burden of 'putting his double jeopardy claim in issue'
and . . . the burden of persuasion shifts to the government once he has met his
burden"); United States v. Benefield, 874 F.2d 1503, 1505 (11th Cir. 1989) (same);
United States v. Ragins, 840 F.2d 1184, 1192-93 (4th Cir. 1988) (same); United States
v. Jabara, 644 F.2d 574, 576-77 (6th Cir. 1981) (same). See generally, Note, The Bur-
den of Proof in Double Jeopardy Claims, 82 Mini. L. REV. 365 (1983). On plain error
review, however, the burden of proof of showing a prejudicial legal error is on the
defendant. See Olano v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 1770, 1778 (1993). Thus, a defendant
who fails to timely raise a double jeopardy argument would be less likely to prevail
on appeal or collateral review. As discussed supra note 100, the Supreme Court has
recognized that the more onerous standard of proof on post-conviction review makes
it highly unlikely that a defendant would intentionally default on an outcome determi-
native claim.
102. 765 F.2d 677 (7th Cir. 1985).
103. Id. at 681.
104. Id.
105. Id.
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proving the offenses were committed."""1 If the evidence were destroyed
before retrial, the defendant would be in a much stronger position.
However, the possibility of such a hypothetical situation actually oc-
curring is remote at best. ' Only the most confident prosecutor would
destroy evidence before the direct appeal of right was completed, and
only the most foolish defendant would forego a meritorious claim of
double jeopardy in the hope that the prosecutor would discard evidence
upon the defendant's filing of the notice of appeal. Furthermore, retrials
are always a foreseeable part of the criminal justice system for both
defendants and the government.'"
More importantly, the prosecution has the burden to prove guilt be-
yond a reasonable doubt.'" The predicate for a trial is a plea of not
guilty, and such a plea puts into issue every fact in the case as well as
every element of the charged offense. If a prosecutor charges a defen-
dant with two offenses, intending to secure a conviction on both, she
must know that she is going to have to prove, as charged in the indict-
ment, the elements of two distinct and separate crimes. When the claim
raised on appeal is based on factual multiplicity and the defendant has
been found guilty of the two offenses by a properly instructed jury, then
106. Id.
107. The chances of an incident as described in this hypothetical actually occurring
are virtually impossible because in order to prosecute under two separate counts
based on two quantities of suspected drugs, both substances would have to be tested
to make sure they were controlled substances. Therefore, the chemical analysis of the
purity of both samples would be available in such a case.
108. The Department of Justice has established policies to ensure that evidence is
not discarded until it is clear that such evidence is no longer needed. 3 United States
Department of Justice, United States Attorney's Manual, 4.380, at 19-20 (Oct. 1,
1990). Moreover, in the Southern District of Illinois. for example, the District where
the G-iffin case was tried, local rules provide that exhibits become part of the re-
cord maintained by the Clerk of the Court so that they can be available for the
court of appeals to examine. See S.D. Ill. Loc. R. 15. Many districts require the clerk
to maintain custody of exhibits; if they are retained by the parties, they are required
to make them available for use on appeal. See, e.g., S.D. Cal. Loc. R. 79.1 (stating
that it is "counsel's responsibility to produce any and all exhibits for the court of
appeals"); D. Colo. Loc. R. 79.1 (providing that exhibits may not be removed from
the custody of the clerk except by court order); D. Idaho Loc. R. 79.1(b) (same); D.
Mass. Loc. R. 79.1(A) (requiring parties to retain exhibits until the final conclusion of
the proceedings); E.D. Pa. Loc. R. 39 (providing that clerk retain custody of all ex-
hibits). Therefore, even if a prosecutor wanted to discard evidence as soon as the
district court proceedings were completed, in most cases it would be either criminal,
impossible, or unethical to intentionally do so.
109. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
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only where the evidence is legally insufficient to show two crimes will
one of the convictions be set aside. In Griffin, the court had no difficulty
in finding that the prosecution had pleaded and proved two separate
crimes, despite the fact that the multiplicity challenge had not been
raised until appeal."" Where the issue is a question of law, that is,
whether essentially undisputed facts constitute one crime or two, then
there is little possibility of prejudice resulting to the government.
Because there is no strategic reason to sandbag a meritorious double
jeopardy claim, when an appellate court reviews a meritorious claim of
double jeopardy raised for the first time on appeal, the claim will ordi-
narily have been forfeited, not as part of a trial strategy, but as a result
of counsel's incompetence. The error will often rise to the level of consti-
tutionally ineffective assistance of counsel.' A conviction is unfair and
110. United States v. Griffin, 765 F.2d 677, 682-83 (7th Cir. 1985).
111. A defendant alleging that his counsel was constitutionally ineffective must show
two things:
First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient. This
requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not
functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the
defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.
This requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the
defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
All attorneys, even nonspecialists, are expected to be familiar with double jeopar-
dy principles. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 739 F.2d 1354, 1358 (8th Cir. 1984) ("A
competent attorney need not be schooled in the area of criminal law in order to know
that the Fifth Amendment's [Diouble [Jleopardy [CIlause prohibits more than one con-
viction for the same crime.").
The Court has stated that a single, serious error may constitute ineffective assis-
tance of counsel. Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 383 (1986) (citing United
States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 657 n.20 (1984)). Notably, professors LaFave and Israel
commented that failure to raise a meritorious claim of double jeopardy was the kind
of single error that may constitute ineffective assistance of counsel: "A possible strate-
gy justification is more difficult to hypothesize . . . where counsel failed to raise a
claim of apparent merit which would have resulted in dismissal of the charges with
prejudice-such as double jeopardy . LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 26, § 11.10(c)
at 51 (West Supp. 1991).
Accordingly, many courts have held that failure to raise a double jeopardy defense
founded in existing law constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel. In Murphy v.
Puckett, 893 F.2d 94, 95 (5th Cir. 1990), for example, the court affirmed a grant of a
writ of habeas corpus where defense counsel "failed to raise what was clearly a valid
double jeopardy defense." Similarly, in Rice v. Marshall, 816 F.2d 1126, 1131-32 (6th
Cir. 1987), the court affirmed a judgment granting a writ where defense counsel failed
to object to the introduction of evidence that appellant possessed a firearm, when he
had previously been acquitted of possessing that firearm. Accord Burgess v. Griffin, 585
F. Supp. 1564, 1572-73 (W.D.N.C.) (finding that advice to plead guilty to jeopardy-barred
charges constituted ineffective assistance of counsel), aff d per cuitam on opinion
below, 743 F.2d 1064 (4th Cir. 1984); Sandy v. Caspari, No. 91-1603 C(5), 1993 U.S.
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casts doubt on the integrity of the judicial system when it results from
inadequate representation by defense counsel. Moreover, it may be a
false economy to refuse to review a meritorious double jeopardy claim
raised for the first time on appeal, because often it will warrant collateral
relief as ineffective assistance of trial counsel.
Double jeopardy should be reviewed for plain error for an additional
reason. Double jeopardy is designed to limit the discretion of the prose-
cutor by restricting her ability to harass, intentionally or not, by pursuing
multiple prosecutions." ' To allow prosecutors to violate this rule, and
provide no remedy if they can simply get by defense counsel, would
effectively encourage efforts to evade the rule. If the prosecutor believed
in good faith that the second prosecution was constitutional, then again,
it is in the interest of the system to have the court of appeals decide the
case on the merits to determine whether, under the circumstances, the
Double Jeopardy Clause permitted further prosecution.
Another consideration comes into play with regard to claims of multi-
ple punishment for the same offense. By convicting and sentencing a
defendant twice for conduct constituting a single crime, the district court
is acting contrary to the intent of Congress. Separation of powers princi-
Dist. LEXIS 1324 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 21, 1993); Alvarado v. State, 574 So.2d 274, 275 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (failure to raise meritorious double jeopardy claim constituted
ineffective assistance of counsel); Commonwealth v. Cardenuto, 548 N.E.2d 864, 869
n.l1 (Mass. 1990) (same); Commonwealth v. Wideman, 306 A.2d 894, 896 (Pa. 1973)
(same); Cobbs v. State, 408 S.E.2d 223, 225 (S.C. 1991) (recognizing defense counsel's
failure to investigate potential double jeopardy claim as ineffective assistance of coun-
sel). However, counsel is not deemed ineffective for failing to raise a meritless double
jeopardy claim, United States v. Parker, 960 F.2d 498, 502 (5th Cir. 1992), or one
based on novel interpretation of the law, Harmon v. Ryan, 657 F. Supp. 623, 626-27
(M.D. Pa. 1986) (holding that counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise issue that
became promising only after appeal); Aillon v. Connecticut, 597 F. Supp. 158, 163-64
(D. Conn. 1984) (assuming arguendo that double jeopardy claim had merit, attorney's
motion for a new trial, rather than for a double jeopardy dismissal, based on judicial
overreaching designed to provoke a mistrial, was a reasonable decision based on the
law at the time), affd, 770 F.2d 157 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. den lied, 478 U.S. 1021 (1986).
112. Professor Sigler describes the policy behind the Double Jeopardy Clause as "a
principle employed by the state to control one of its own officials in the interest of
a greater community concern, which is the protection of the liberties of the criminal
defendant." JAY A. SIGLER, DOUBLE JEOPARI)Y, TIlE DEVELOPMENT OF A LEGAL AND SO-
CIAL POLICY, 155 (1969). In essence, the Double Jeopardy Clause functions as a "limi-
tation upon the discretion of the prosecutor because it determines the number of
times that a criminal action can be instituted." Id.; see also Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S.
493, 502 (1984) (commenting that Double Jeopardy Clause is intended to prevent
governmental overreaching).
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pies warrant imposition of a lawful sentence by the appellate court, re-
gardless of the defendant's diligence in raising the issue. As the Supreme
Court explained: "[T]he disruption to sound appellate process entailed by
entertaining objections not raised below does not always overcome...
'the strong interest of the federal judiciary in maintaining the constitu-
tional plan of separation of powers.' '"." It is unseemly for a court to im-
pose an illegal sentence, in defiance of the legislative scheme.
The government will ordinarily not be prejudiced when a double jeop-
ardy claim is raised for the first time on appeal. Although charges may
be dismissed, the government will be in a similar, if not the same, posi-
tion as if the claim had been raised before or during trial. In United
States v. Lorenzo,"4 the government suggested that double jeopardy
claims should not be considered on appeal, stating that "plain error anal-
ysis is difficult to undertake because the issue turns on facts not in the
record, a circumstance directly traceable to the appellant's failure to
make a timely objection.""' The court did not find this objection dis-
positive because in order "[tlo prevail, [defendants] must show, based on
the record" that a double jeopardy violation occurred."" Accordingly,
"appellants, rather than the government, pay the price for the inadequacy
of the record.""7 Therefore, the government will not suffer unfair preju-
dice because a conviction cannot be reversed for plain error unless the
facts to be relied upon appear in the record."'
IV. MOST FEDERAL COURTS REFUSE TO REVIEW DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAIMS
UNDER THE PLAIN ERROR STANDARD, BUT THEY FAIL TO
EXPLAIN WHY IT IS SUBJECT TO UNIQUE TREATMENT
Federal courts generally do not review double jeopardy claims for
plain error under Rule 52(b). Unlike most unobjected-to errors, federal
113. Freytag v. Commissioner, 111 S. Ct. 2631, 2639 (1991) (quoting Glidden Co. v.
Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 536 (1962)).
114. 995 F.2d 1448 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 225, and cert. denied, 114 S.
Ct. 227 (1993).
115. Id. at 1458 n.4.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Of course, in determining whether a conviction is barred by double jeopardy,
judicial notice of court records is possible under Federal Rule of Evidence 201(f). See
United States v. Marren, 890 F.2d 924, 934 (7th Cir. 1989) (taking judicial notice of
proceedings in a related federal case to determine whether a double jeopardy viola-
tion occurred). See generally 21 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & KENNETH GRAIiAM, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, §§ 5101-5111 (1977 & 1993 Supp.) (discussing judicial no-
tice; specifically, § 5110 discusses judicial notice taken on appeal).
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courts hold that a claim of double jeopardy left unobjected to is deemed
absolutely waived. The Supreme Court, however, has never decided the
issue."' Nevertheless, the rule of waiver has been accepted by the
119. It is undisputed that a double jeopardy claim may be waived. See, e.g.,
Ricketts v. Adamson, 483 U.S. 1 (1987) (recognizing waiver through written plea
agreement). The Supreme Court, however, has never been faced with the question of
whether a waiver resulting from a failure to object at trial precludes review on ap-
peal. Peretz v. United States, 111 S. Ct. 2661, 2669 (1991), discussed the issue in dic-
ta, listing double jeopardy as one of a number of claims that could be forfeited by
not being timely asserted, but said nothing about whether the issue could be raised
as plain error. See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text.
United States v. Wilson, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 150 (1833), is occasionally cited for the
proposition that double jeopardy must be raised in the pleadings or else it is deemed
waived. See e.g., McNeal v. Hollowell, 481 F.2d 1145, 1153 (5th Cir. 1973) (Coleman,
J., dissenting), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 951 (1974); Douglas v. Nixon, 459 F.2d 325, 327
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1010 (1972); Brady v. United States, 24 F.2d 399, 405
(8th Cir. 1928). Wilson came to the Supreme Court upon a certificate of division of
the judges of a circuit court, who were equally divided on the question of whether
they had the power to impose a sentence for a crime where it appeared that the de-
fendant, who pleaded guilty, may have received a presidential pardon for the offense.
Wilson, 32 U.S. at 159-60. The Court held that following a judgment of conviction,
.no subsequent prosecution could be maintained for the same offence, nor for any
part of it, provided the former conviction was pleaded," and that the same rule ap-
plied to a pardon. Id. at 160. The defendant expressly rejected the benefit of the
pardon at the time of sentencing in the circuit court. Id. at 158-59. The Court held
that the defendant could be sentenced 'in spite of the pardon because it had not
been pleaded. Id. at 161.
However, the Court made clear that the rule would be different if the waiver
resulted not from the defendant's express determination not to accept the pardon, but
from an unintentional failure to raise the issue. The Court accepted the proposition
that an implied waiver resulting from pleading without raising the pardon would not
be a bar; in such a case "the prisoner may avail himself of the pardon, by showing
it to the court, even after waiving it, by pleading the general issue." Id. at 162. "[A]
court would, undoubtedly, at this day, permit a pardon to be used, after [a plea to]
the general issue." Id. The Court, however, made no mention of whether a claim
waived through failure to raise would be cognizable for the first time on appeal,
perhaps because there was no general right to appeal in a criminal case in the fed-
eral court system at that time. See Carroll v. United States, 354 U.S. 394, 400 n.9
(1957). Thus, if Wilson could be said to contain the seeds of the rule of waiver, it
also served to foreshadow plain error review.
In United States v. La Franca, 282 U.S. 568 (1931), the Court held that a failure
to accept a ruling of the district court overruling pleas of former jeopardy did not
preclude consideration on appeal where the issues were brought to the court's atten-
tion and there was "nothing in the record to indicate waiver of the respondent's
rights." Id. at 570-71. This was apparently not a relaxation of otherwise applicable
preservation requirements for double jeopardy claims, but instead was based on the
established rule that exceptions were not required for rulings on pleadings that ap-
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Courts of Appeals for the District of Columbia' and the First,'2'
Second, 122 Third,'3 Fifth, 4 Sixth,' Seventh,
21 Eighth, .7
peared in the "strict record" of the case. Nalle v. Oyster, 230 U.S. 165, 176-77 (1913).
120. United States v. Harris, 959 F.2d 246, 251 n.2 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 362, and cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 364 (1992); United States v. Scott,
464 F.2d 832, 833 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Miller v. United States, 41 U.S. App. D.C. 52, 62,
cert. denied, 231 U.S. 755 (1913); see also United States v. Reeves, 293 F. Supp. 213,
214 (D.D.C. 1968) (denying motion in arrest of judgment).
121. United States v. Lopez-Pena, 912 F.2d 1542, 1548 (1st Cir. 1989) (dicta), vacat-
ed on other grounds sub nom., United States v. Martinez-Torres, 912 F.2d 1552 (1st
Cir. 1990) (en banc), overruled by Peretz v. United States, 111 S. Ct. 2661, decision
vacated reh'g denied, 944 F.2d 51 (1st Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2886
(1991).
122. United States v. Proyect, 989 F.2d 84, 86 (2d Cir.) (dicta), cert. denied, 114 S.
Ct. 80 (1993); United States v. Papadakis, 802 F.2d 618, 621 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. de-
nied, 479 U.S. 1092 (1987); United States v. Walsh, 700 F.2d 846, 856 (2d Cir.) (dic-
ta), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 825 (1983); United States v. Perez, 565 F.2d 1227, 1232 (2d
Cir. 1977); see also United States v. Gumbs, 246 F.2d 441, 443 (2d Cir. 1957) (Hincks,
J., concurring) (contending that defendant's guilty plea waived a double jeopardy
claim based on multiplicity. The majority rejected the claim after reaching the mer-
its); cf. United States v. DeFillipo, 590 F.2d 1228, 1233 (2d Cir.) (noting that Perez
applied the rule of waiver, but stopping short of stating that the rule of waiver was
still valid, and recognizing the possibility that a multiplicity argument could be raised
on appeal), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 920 (1979).
123. United States v. Becker, 892 F.2d 265, 267-68 (3d Cir. 1989); United States v.
Inmon, 568 F.2d 326, 330 (3d Cir. 1977) (dicta). In United States v. Young, 503 F.2d
1072, 1074 (3d Cir. 1974), the court held that "[ilt is manifest that a claim of double
jeopardy is an affirmative defense which must be raised properly or may be deemed
waived." The court, however, held that the district court did not err by deciding the
claim even though it was not raised until the eleventh day of a twelve-day trial. De-
fense counsel explained that he raised the issue as soon as he learned the basis of
the claim, that is, that the crime for which his client was already in custody was
arguably the same offense for double jeopardy purposes. The court concluded that
such an inadvertent failure to raise the issue did not appear to be a knowing and
voluntary waiver of the right. Id. at 1075.
124. United States v. Moore, 958 F.2d 646, 650 (5th Cir. 1992); United States v.
Milhim, 702 F.2d 522, 523-24 (5th Cir. 1983); United States v. Silva, 611 F.2d 78, 80
(5th Cir. 1980); Grogan v. United States, 394 F.2d 287, 289 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. de-
nied, 393 U.S. 830 (1968); see also United States v. Beasley, 550 F.2d 261, 274-75 &
275 n.18 (5th Cir.) (noting that the appellant should have raised the double jeopardy
argument before the second trial, but finding it meritless nonetheless), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 863 (1977); McNeal v. Hollowell, 481 F.2d 1145, 1153 (5th Cir. 1973)
(Coleman, J., dissenting) (questioning whether the appellant had the right to raise a
plea of double jeopardy on collateral review), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 951 (1974);
Ochoa v. Estelle, 445 F. Supp. 1076, 1081-82 (W.D. Tex. 1976) (denying petition for
habeas corpus; dicta as to federal law); United States v. Lawson, 57 F. Supp. 664,
667 (N.D. Tex. 1944) (sentencing memorandum).
125. United States v. Thomas, 875 F.2d 559, 562 n.2 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S.
867 (1989); Martin v. United States. 996 F.2d 1215, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 17652 (6th
Cir. 1993) (finding no cause and prejudice that would warrant reviewing double jeop-
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Ninth,12' Tenth,'2' and Eleventh""' Circuits.
Another group of decisions hold that the issue cannot be raised by a
state"' or federal-' prisoner on collateral review. These cases do not
rely on the special procedural constraints applicable to defendants seek-
ardy claim on § 2255 motion; noting the general rule in the circuit that failure to
raise an issue at an earlier stage constitutes waiver).
126. United States v. Brimberry, 744 F.2d 580, 586-87 (7th Cir. 1984) (dicta); United
States v. Buonomo, 441 F.2d 922, 924-25 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 845 (1971).
127. United States v. Conley, 503 F.2d 520, 521 (8th Cir. 1974); Pope v. United
States, 434 F.2d 325, 329 (8th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 949 (1971); Wangrow
v. United States, 399 F.2d 106, 112 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 933 (1968); Brady
v. United States, 24 F.2d 399, 405 (8th Cir. 1928); ef. United States v. Standefer, 948
F.2d 426, 430-33 (8th Cir. 1991) (refusing to consider legal theories not raised below
in an interlocutory appeal of double jeopardy motion.).
128. United States v. Avendano, 455 F.2d 975, 975 (9th Cir.) (per curiam), cert.
denied, 407 U.S. 912 (1972); Haddad v. United States, 349 F.2d 511, 514 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 896 (1965); Levin v. United States, 5 F.2d 598, 606 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 269 U.S. 562 (1925); see also United States v. Flick, 716 F.2d 735, 737
(9th Cir. 1983) (noting the rule in the case where the claim had been timely raised);
cf. United States v. Hill, 473 F.2d 759, 763 (9th Cir. 1972) (noting that the defense of
former jeopardy is usually pleaded and can be waived).
129. Morlan v. United States, 230 F.2d 30, 32 (10th Cir. 1956); Curtis v. United
States, 67 F.2d 943, 948 (10th Cir. 1933); Callahan v. United States, 35 F.2d 633, 634
(10th Cir. 1929).
130. United States v. Bascaro, 742 F.2d 1335, 1365 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
472 U.S. 1017, and cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1021 (1985); see also United States v.
LeQuire, 943 F.2d 1554, 1564 (11th Cir. 1991) (relying on Bascaro to find that the
appellant waived his ex post facto law claim), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3037 (1992).
131. Paul v. Henderson, 698 F.2d 589, 592 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 835
(1983); Cox v. Crouse, 376 F.2d 824, 826 (10th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 865 (1967); Barker v. Ohio, 328 F.2d 582, 584 (6th Cir. 1964); see also McClain
v. Brown, 587 F.2d 389, 391 (8th Cir. 1978) (involving 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
132. United States v. Herzog, 644 F.2d 713, 716 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 451 U.S.
1018 (1981); Ferina v. United States, 340 F.2d 837, 838-39 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 381
U.S. 902 (1965); Kistner v. United States, 332 F.2d 978, 980 (8th Cir. 1964); United
States v. Hoyland, 264 F.2d 346, 351 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 845 (1959);
Harris v. United States, 237 F.2d 274, 277 (8th Cir. 1956); Berg v. United States, 176
F.2d 122, 125 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 876 (1949); McGinley v. Hudspeth, 120
F.2d 523, 525 (10th Cir. 1941); Caballero v. Hudspeth, 114 F.2d 545, 547 (10th Cir.
1940), overruled by United States v. Broce, 753 F.2d 811 (10th Cir. 1985) on rehg,
781 F.2d 792 (10th Cir. 1986) (en banc), rev'd, 488 U.S. 563 (1989); Bracey v. Zerbst,
93 F.2d 8, 9-10 (10th Cir. 1937); Blair v. White, 24 F.2d 323, 324-25 (8th Cir. 1928);
Graham v. Squier, 53 F. Supp. 881, 883 (D. Wash.), ffd on other grounds, 145 F.2d
348 (9th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 845 (1945); United States v. Coy, 45 F.
Supp. 499, 501 (W.D. Ky. 1942); United States v. Harrison, 23 F. Supp. 249, 252
(S.D.N.Y.), affd, 99 F.2d 1017 (2d Cir. 1938).
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ing post-conviction relief, "' but instead rely on cases involving direct
appeals, applying the rule of waiver.'' The commentators are in accord
on this matter.'
Only in the Fourth Circuit is the rule that double jeopardy claims are
reviewable absent an objection, and the point is established by a single
case. ' The few cases in other circuits that state or imply that double
jeopardy claims are reviewable for plain error-one each from the
First,' 7 Third,'38  Sixth,"' Seventh,'4' and Tenth."' Circuits-have
133. In Engle v. Issac, 456 U.S. 107 (1982), a habeas corpus case, and United States
v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 167 (1982), a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 case, the Court held that
where procedural rules required a defendant to raise a claim at trial, a defendant at-
tempting to raise the issue for the first time on collateral review would have to
show "cause" for the failure to raise the issue, and "prejudice" resulting therefrom.
134. Some cases find the fact that the issue was raised on collateral review instead
of at trial to be determinative. See, e.g., Selsor v. Kaiser, No. 93-5002, 1994 U.S. App.
LEXIS 9488, at *19-22 (10th Cir. May 2, 1994) (refusing to grant writ based on meri-
torious, but procedurally defaulted, double jeopardy claim); United States ex rel.
DiGiangiemo v. Regan, 528 F.2d 1262, 1269-70 (2d Cir. 1975) (finding that, based on
the circumstances of the case, a collateral estoppel claim could not be raised for the
first time in a habeas proceeding), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 950 (1976); Rollerson v.
United States, 405 F.2d 1078, 1081 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (per curiam), vacated on other
grounds, 394 U.S. 575 (1969); Lotz v. Sacks, 292 F.2d 657, 659 (6th Cir. 1961); United
States ex rel. Poch v. Hill, 71 F.2d 906, 907 (3d Cir.) (commenting that a federal
prisoner cannot raise double jeopardy issue through habeas corpus, but should have
done so on appeal), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 597 (1934).
However, in Washington v. James, 996 F.2d 1442, 1450 (2d Cir. 1993), Chief
Judge Meskill suggested that double jeopardy was so fundamental that it was one of
the few issues reviewable on habeas corpus in spite of a procedural default without
reference to the cause and prejudice test.
135. Two leading commentators agree that an appellant may not raise a double
jeopardy claim for the first time on appeal. See 8 JAMES W. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL
PRACTICE 12.03[21 at 12-23 to 12-33 (2d ed. 1991); 1 CIIARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 193 at 706 (2d ed. 1982).
136. United States v. Jarvis, 7 F.3d 404 (4th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1200
(1994).
137. United States v. Rivera, 872 F.2d 507, 509 (1st Cir.) (vacating conviction as
plain error based on meritorious double jeopardy claim raised for the first time on
appeal), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 818 (1989).
138. Virgin Islands v. Smith, 445 F.2d 1089, 1094 (3d Cir. 1971) (reversing convic-
tion, sua sponte, as plain error, based on double jeopardy claim that had not been
raised either at trial or on appeal); cf. United .States ex rel. Poch v. Hill, 71 F.2d 906,
907 (3d Cir.) (rejecting double jeopardy claim raised for the first time on collateral
review as untimely; noting in dicta that appellant should have raised the claim on
direct appeal), cort. denied, 293 U.S. 597 (1934).
139. Reynolds v. United States, 280 F. 1, 4 (6th Cir. 1922) (reviewing claim raised
for the first time after conviction in a motion for a new trial and for arrest of judg-
ment). The Supreme Court held in an early case that any error noticeable in a mo-
tion for arrest of judgment would be noticeable on appeal through a writ of error.
Slacom v. Pomery, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 221 (1810).
140. United States v. Anderson, 514 F.2d 583, 586 (7th Cir. 1975) (evaluating double
1186
[Vol. 21: 1161, 1994] Double Jeopardy
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
been ignored by other panels, even in their own circuits.142 One decision
each in the Second,"' Sixth, 4  Eighth,14' and Ninth 4' Circuits hints
jeopardy issue "mentioned" although not formally raised in trial court, and finding it
meritless); see also United States v. Marren, 890 F.2d 924, 934 (7th Cir. 1989) (re-
viewing double jeopardy claim raised for the first time on appeal with no discussion
of waiver or reviewability).
141. United States v. Gunter, 546 F.2d 861, 865 (10th Cir. 1976) (rejecting claim on
merits, but recognizing that "[if in fact there were a violation of the defendant's
Fifth Amendment right not to be twice placed in jeopardy for the same offense, such
would surely be the type of 'plain error' which could be raised for the first time on
appeal"), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 947, and cert. denied, 431 U.S. 920 (1977).
142. In spite of the prior opinions that have indicated the availability of plain error
review, other panels in the First, Third, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits have restated the
traditional rule of waiver without mentioning those earlier opinions which suggest the
possibility of review despite the absence of a timely objection. See United States v.
Lopez-Pena, 912 F.2d 1542, 1548 (1st Cir.1989) (dicta), vacated on other grounds sub
nom., United States v. Martinez-Torres, 912 F.2d 1552 (1st Cir. 1990) (en banc), over-
ruled by Peretz v. United States, 111 S. Ct. 2661, decision vacated reh'g denied. 944
F.2d 51 (1st Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2886 (1991); United States v.
Becker, 892 F.2d 265, 267-68 (3d Cir. 1989); United States v. Thomas, 875 F.2d 559,
562 n.2 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 867 (1989); United States v. Brimberry, 744
F.2d 580, 586-87 (7th Cir. 1984) (dicta).
143. United States v. MacQueen, 596 F.2d 76, 81-82 (2d Cir. 1979) (declining to
apply United States v. Perez, 565 F.2d 1227 (2d Cir. 1977) and distinguishing
Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974) and Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61 (1975)
(characterizing as fundamental the right not to be hauled into court twice for the
same offense; considering the right so important as to preclude waiver by a guilty
plea in the second prosecution)); Cf United States v. DeFillipo, 590 F.2d 1228, 1233
n.4 (2d Cir.) (noting Professor Westen's argument that under Blackledge v. Perry, 417
U.S. 21 (1974), the Constitution may require courts to take note of constitutional de-
fenses even if not timely raised, but declining to take a firm position on the ques-
tion), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 920 (1979).
144. Douglas v. Nixon, 459 F.2d 325, 327 (6th Cir.) (finding that although "[ilt ap-
pears to be a rule of long standing that the facts constituting double jeopardy must
be shown by pleading it as a defense . . . whether time and intervening decisions of
the Supreme Court have eroded [this] ground for denial of the writ" is moot because
the court predicted, incorrectly, that Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387 (1970), would not
be applied retroactively, based on Robinson v. Neil, 452 F.2d 370 (6th Cir. 1971),
rev'd, 409 U.S. 505 (1973)), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1010 (1972).
145. Parker v. United States, 507 F.2d 587, 588 (8th Cir. 1974) ("The question of
whether counsel is empowered to effectively waive the double jeopardy defense with-
out his client's knowledge is a difficult one which we leave to a future deci-
sion . . . ."), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 916 (1975).
146. United States v. Lorenzo, 995 F.2d 1448, 1457-58 (9th Cir.) (declining to defini-
tively resolve the plain error issue due to the failure of the double jeopardy claim on
the merits), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 225, and cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 227 (1993). The
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that the rule of waiver might be reconsidered. Courts in subsequent cas-
es, however, have disregarded these opinions.' In addition, a handful
of unpublished opinions have reviewed double jeopardy claims raised for
the first time on appeal and found them meritless. However, these are,
by their own terms, non-precedential."'
The law is only slightly less one-sided on the reviewability of
unobjected-to claims of "multiplicity." Multiplicity claims involve con-
viction and sentence on more than one count for conduct that by law is
but a single offense."' The overwhelming weight of authority holds that
a multiplicity claim is waived unless objection to the indictment is made
before trial.'' Panels in the District of Columbia,'"' and First,"'2 Sec-
court stated that "[lit is not clear whether we can review for plain error a double
jeopardy claim that has been waived." Id. In an appeal by one of Lorenzo's co-defen-
dants, the court made clear that "Lorenzo is the law of this circuit and it establishes
that Dewey waived her double jeopardy claim by failing to raise it until after her
trial." United States v. Dewey, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 29240, at *3 (9th Cir. Nov. 2,
1993) (citing Lorenzo, 995 F.2d at 1457-58). This language from Dewey suggests that
any uncertainty expressed in Lorenzo may have been resolved against plain error re-
viewability.
147. The Second, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits adhered to the general rule even after
the rendering of the following decisions, among others: United States v. Papadakis,
802 F.2d 618, 621 (2d Cir. 1986) (court need not reach double jeopardy claim raised
for the first time on appeal), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1092 (1987); United States v.
Thomas, 875 F.2d 559, 562 n.2 (6th Cir.) (defendant waived double jeopardy claim by
failing to raise it at trial), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 867 (1989); United States v. Herzog,
644 F.2d 713, 716 (8th Cir.) (double jeopardy claim waived if not raised before trial),
cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1018 (1981).
148. See, e.g., United States v. Shorts, No. 92-5405, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 6110, at
*4 (4th Cir. Mar. 23, 1993) (per curiam) (finding no plain error where double jeopar-
dy claim waived because not raised below); United States v. Whitehead, No. 91-5527,
1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 27797, at *1 (4th Cir. Oct. 21, 1992) (per curiam) (declaring
"[a] defendant's failure to object at sentencing waives the issue on appeal in the
absence of plain error"); United States v. Nichols, 977 F.2d 583, 1992 U.S. App.
LEXIS 25034, at *9 (6th Cir. 1992) (per curiam) (reviewing double jeopardy claim
solely for plain error in the absence of objection below); United States v. Lee, 967
F.2d 594, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 14971, at *8 (9th Cir. 1992) (reviewing unobjected-to
double jeopardy claim solely for plain error); United States v. Bubbel, No. 90-10503,
1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 30562, at *2-3 (9th Cir. Dec. 19, 1991) (same); United States v.
Smith, 928 F.2d 409, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 4169, at *1 (9th Cir. 1991) (same).
149. See supra note 53; United States v. UCO Oil Co., 546 F.2d 833, 835 (9th Cir.
1976) (stating that "an indictment may not charge a single offense in several counts
without offending the rule against multiplicity"), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 966 (1977).
150. See infra notes 151-60.
151. United States v. Clarke, No. 91-3313, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 11596, at *6-9 (D.C.
Cir May 20, 1994); United States v. Harris, 959 F.2d 246, 250-51 (D.C. Cir.) (per curi-
am), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 362, and cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 364 (1992).
152. United States v. Connolly, No. 93-1625, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 31591, at *4 n.4
(1st Cir. Dec. 7, 1993) (per curiam) (multiplicity claim waived where not raised be-
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ond,''" Fourth, 4 Fifth,'5  Sixth,'" Seventh, ' 7 Eighth,'" Ninth,',"
and Eleventh" Circuits have held that failure to raise an objection to a
fore trial); United States v. Marrero, No. 92-2101, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 6521, at *4
(1st Cir. Mar. 29, 1993) (per curiam) (same); United States v. Rodriguez, 858 F.2d
809, 816-17 (Ist Cir. 1988); United States v. Serino, 835 F.2d 924, 929-30 (1st Cir.
1987) (same); United States v. Sheehy, 541 F.2d 123, 130 (Ist Cir. 1976) (same).
153. United States v. Alessi, 638 F.2d 466, 476 (2d Cir. 1980) (failure to raise a
multiplicity claim before trial serves as a bar to review on appeal); United States v.
Private Brands, Inc., 250 F.2d 554, 557 (2d Cir. 1957) (any claim of multiplicity
waived by failing to raise it before trial), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 957 (1958).
154. United States v. Price, 763 F.2d 640, 643 (4th Cir. 1985) (multiplicity claim
waived by failing to raise it at trial).
155. United States v. Lemons, 941 F.2d 309, 316 n.4 (5th Cir. 1991) (per curiam)
("Failure to object to an indictment on grounds of multiplicity prior to trial consti-
tutes a waiver of that objection."); United States v. Gerald, 624 F.2d 1291, 1300 (5th
Cir. 1980) (declining to evaluate defendant's multiplicity claim on the ground that
defendant failed to raise the issue before trial), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 920 (1981).
156. United States v. Tongo, 16 F.3d 1223, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 2136, at *14 n.6
(6th Cir. 1994) (per curiam) (multiplicity claim waived because not raised below);
United States v. Colbert, 977 F.2d 203, 208 (6th Cir. 1992) (declining to entertain
defendant's claim that indictment for distribution of narcotics was multiplicitous be-
cause of failure to object before trial); United States v. Woods, 544 F.2d 242, 251
(6th Cir. 1976) (same), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1062, and cert. denied, 430 U.S. 969,
and cert. denied, 431 U.S. 954 (1977); cf. United States v. Crimson, 905 F.2d 966, 969
(6th Cir. 1990) (following Woods in the context of a waived suppression claim).
157. United States v. Mitran, 996 F.2d 1220, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 12808 (7th Cir.
1993) (multiplicity claim waived where raised for the first time on appeal); United
States v. Wilson, 962 F.2d 621, 626 (7th Cir. 1992) (failure to raise multiplicity claim
at trial deemed a waiver of claim); United States v. Simone, 931 F.2d 1186, 1192 (7th
Cir.) ("[Flailure to object to alleged defects in the indictment before trial constitutes
a waiver."), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 584 (1991); United States v. Moya-Gomez, 860
F.2d 706, 749 n.36 (7th Cir. 1988) (same), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 908 (1989); United
States v. Mosely, 786 F.2d 1330, 1333 (7th Cir.) (restating rule that parties must raise
claims of multiplicity and duplicity before trial), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1184 (1986);
United States v. Griffin, 765 F.2d 677, 680-81 (7th Cir. 1985) (noting the apparent
division in the circuits, but holding that a multiplicity claim which could have been
waived before trial is waived) (involving § 2255); see also United States v. Scherl, 923
F.2d 64, 66 (7th Cir.) (holding that failure to raise claim constitutes a waiver and
finding no plain error), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2272 (1991).
158. United States v. Garrett, 961 F.2d 743, 748 & n.7 (8th Cir. 1992) (multiplicity
claim must be raised before trial otherwise it is deemed waived); United States v.
Herzog, 644 F.2d 713, 716 (8th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1018 (1981).
159. United States v. Berry, No. 92-16647, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 9524, at *3 (9th
Cir. Apr. 20, 1994) (holding in an appeal of an order denying § 2255 motion multi-
plicity claim waived where it was not raised before trial).
160. United States v. Wilson, 983 F.2d 221, 225 (11th Cir. 1993) (defendant barred
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multiplicitous indictment prior to trial constitutes waiver. Other panels in
the Second, "' Third,"2 F~fth, " ' Sixth,' 4 Ninth,6 ' and Eleventh.6
from challenging bank fraud convictions on grounds of multiplicity for the first time
on appeal); United States v. Solomon, 726 F.2d 677, 678 n.2 (l1th Cir. 1984) (multi-
plicity claim waived where defendant plead guilty before trial). The Eleventh Circuit
announced a new rule in United States v. Jones, 899 F.2d 1097, 1103 (11th Cir.), cert.
denied, 498 U.S. 906 (1990), requiring all sentencing objections to be raised at the
time of sentencing subject to waiver, in the absence of "manifest injustice." Wilson
applied Jones to multiplicity cases, overruling the Eleventh Circuit cases cited infra
notes 166, 173. If "manifest injustice" means plain error, then it is unnecessary. If, as
appears to be the case, manifest injustice is a higher standard, Jones and Wilson
raise the question of whether a federal appeals court has the power to decide pro-
spectively to refuse to exercise its discretion under Rule 52(b).
161. United States v. Reed, 639 F.2d 896, 904 n.6 (2d Cir. 1981) (stating that when
multiplicitous counts result in conviction, the situation "can be remedied at any time
by merging the convictions and permitting only a single sentence"); United States v.
Moss, 562 F.2d 155, 159 n.2 (2d Cir. 1977) (noting that government conceded point),
cert. denied, 435 U.S. 914 (1978); see also United States v. DeFillipo, 590 F.2d 1228,
1233 (2d Cir.) (stating, in dicta, that a defendant might be able to raise a claim as to
consecutive sentences), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 920 (1979); Natarelli v. United States,
516 F.2d 149, 152 n.4 (2d Cir. 1975) (claim raised for the first time on collateral
review); Gorman v. United States, 456 F.2d 1258, 1259 (2d Cir. 1972) (per curiam)
(claim raised for first time on collateral review).
162. Virgin Islands v. Brathwaite, 782 F.2d 399, 408 (3d Cir. 1986) (granting relief
from multiplicitous sentences where co-defendant preserved issue); United States v.
Marino, 682 F.2d 449, 454 & n.3 (3d Cir. 1982) (permitting challenge to multiplicitous
sentences for the first time on appeal).
163. United States v. Galvan, 949 F.2d 777, 781 (5th Cir. 1991) (noting that defen-
dant may challenge multiplicity of sentences); United States v. Munoz-Romo, 947 F.2d
170, 174 (5th Cir. 1991) (same), vacated and remanded, 113 S. Ct. 30 (1992), adhered
to in pertinent part, 989 F.2d 757, 760 (5th Cir. 1993); United States v. Marroquin,
885 F.2d 1240, 1245 (5th Cir. 1989) (same), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1079 (1990); United
States v. Stovall, 825 F.2d 817, 821 (5th Cir. 1987) (same); United States v. Cauble,
706 F.2d 1322, 1334-35 (5th Cir. 1983) (same), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1005 (1984).
164. United States v. Anders, 14 F.3d 602, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 34033, at '*32-33
(6th Cir. 1993) (per curiam) (failure to raise challenge to indictment waived claim as
to multiplicitous convictions, but multiplicitous' sentences could be attacked); United
States v. York, 9 F.3d 111, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 26652, at *4-5 (6th Cir. 1993) (per
curiam) (same); Moody v. United States, 580 F.2d 238, 239 (6th Cir. 1978) (per curi-
am) (same); United States v. Rosenbarger, 536 F.2d 715, 721-22 (6th Cir. 1976) (com-
menting that failure to raise a multiplicity claim at trial should not result in the de-
fendant having to serve an erroneous sentence), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 965 (1977).
165. United States v. Blocker, 802 F.2d 1102, 1103 (9th Cir. 1986) (finding that fail-
ure to interpose pretrial objection does not waive right to object to unlawful multiple
sentences); Launius v. United States, 575 F.2d 770, 772 (9th Cir. 1978) (per curiam)
(same).
166. United States v. Bonavia, 927 F.2d 565, 571 (lth Cir. 1991) (on appeal a de-
fendant may challenge only multiplicity of sentences when no pretrial objections was
made); United States v. Grinkiewicz, 873 F.2d 253, 255 (11th Cir. 1989) (per curiam)
(multiplicity of sentences may be challenged for the first time on appeal); United
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Circuits agree that multiple convictions may be entered on each count of
an allegedly multiplicitous indictment unless the defendant interposes a
pretrial objection, but will permit a challenge to consecutive sentences
for the first time on appeal."7 Panels in the District of Columbia,"
Second,"'9 Fifth,'7 Seventh,'7' Tenth,'7  and Eleventh'7 ' Circuits
have entertained such claims raised for the first time on appeal, and have
reversed both the conviction and the sentence.'74
States v. Davis, 799 F.2d 1490, 1494 (lth Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (same); United
States v. Mastrangelo, 733 F.2d 793, 800 (11th Cir. 1984) (same). Subsequently, these
cases have been overruled. See supra note 160.
167. See also United States v. Martin, 933 F.2d 609, 611 (8th Cir. 1991) (reviewing
multiplicity claim for plain error and finding it meritless). The commentators agree
that relief is available post-conviction, although they do not say precisely what the
relief should be. WRIGTrr & MILLER, supr- note 135, § 145 at 526 ("A remedy is avail-
able at any time if defendant is given multiple sentences."); MOORE, supra note 135,
8.07[11 at 8-43 to 8-45; LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 26, § 17.4.
168. United States v. Johnson, 909 F.2d 1517, 1518-19 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (vacating
multiplicitous conviction: defendant raised the issue for the first time in post-trial
motion in district court).
169. United States v. Coiro, 922 F.2d 1008, 1013-15 (2d Cir.) (acknowledging that
multiplicitous convictions are cognizable on appeal under the plain error doctrine de-
spite the defendant's failure to raise the issue at trial), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2826
(1991); United States v. DiGeronimo, 598 F.2d 746, 751-53 (2d Cir.) (same), cert. de-
nied, 444 U.S. 886 (1979).
170. United States v. Pineda-Ortuno, 952 F.2d 98, 105 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S.
Ct. 1990 (1992); United States v. Devine, 934 F.2d 1325, 1342-43 (5th Cir.), reh'g en
bane denied, 943 F.2d 1315 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 349 (1991), and cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 911, and cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 952, and cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
954, and cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1164, and cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1197 (1992); Unit-
ed States v. Osunegbu, 822 F.2d 472, 481 & n.26 (5th Cir. 1987); United States v.
Bradsby, 628 F.2d 901, 905-06 (5th Cir. 1980) (finding that co-defendant had preserved
the issue).
171. United States v. Podell, 869 F.2d 328. 330-32 (7th Cir. 1989); United States v.
Stavros, 597 F.2d 108, 111-13 (7th Cir. 1979).
172. United States v. Morehead, 959 F.2d 1489, 1506-07 & 1506 n.ll (10th Cir.),
adhered to on other grounds sub non., United States v. Hill, 971 F.2d 1461 (10th Cir.
1992) (en banc).
173. United States v. Smith, 918 F.2d 1501, 1515 & n.5 (lth Cir. 1990) (finding that
co-defendant had preserved the issue), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 151, and cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 253 (1991). This case has apparently been overruled by United States v.
Jones. 899 F.2d 1097, 1103 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 906 (1990). See supra
note 160.
174. At least one judge in the Third Circuit shares this view. In Virgin Islands v.
Brathwaite, 782 F.2d 399, 408 n.9 (3d Cir. 1986), Judge Becker stated in a concurring
opinion that the proper remedy for a multiplicity violation was vacatur of both con-
The cases setting forth the rule of waiver tend to contain little analysis
regarding the treatment other than simple citation of prior authority.
Judge Aldrich of the First Circuit may have recognized this when he
wrote that "a failure to allege double jeopardy might be thought plain
error, but the law has been settled so long on this issue that it seems in
a class by itself."75 If double jeopardy really is "in a class by itself,"
there must be some reason for its unique treatment.
Examination of possible justifications reveals no satisfactory rationale
justifying refusal to apply the plain error doctrine of Rule 52. 11 Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 12 is often cited as a basis for refusing to
consider double jeopardy claims for the first time on appeal, 7 but
close analysis of Rule 12 reveals that its waiver provision does not apply
to double jeopardy claims.
The notion that failure to object constitutes a "waiver" independent of
Rule 12 is also unsatisfying. If failure to object constitutes a waiver, Rule
52(b) becomes meaningless because it applies only where there has been
a failure to object.'71 In addition, the Supreme Court has established a
test for waiver of constitutional rights, and that test is not satisfied by
the mere failure to object.
A. Double Jeopardy Claims Are Not Among Those Which
Rule 12 Requires To Be Made Before Trial On Pain Of Waiver
Rule 12(b) is the most significant potential basis for holding that dou-
ble jeopardy claims are waived if not raised in the trial court.'7" Rule
12(b) requires that certain objections be raised before trial or they are
deemed waived. It now provides:
(b) Pretrial Motions. Any defense, objection, or request which is capable of
determination without the trial of the general issue may be raised before trial by
motion .... The following must be raised prior to trial:
viction and sentence. The other members of the panel agreed that a multiplicity claim
can be raised for the first time on appeal, but favored reversal of only the sentence.
Id. at 408.
175. United States v. Lopez-Pena, 912 F.2d 1542, 1552 (1st Cir. 1989)(Aldrich. J.. dis-
senting), vacated on other grounds sub nom., United States v. Martinez-Torres, 912
F.2d 1552 (1st Cir. 1990) (en banc), overruled by Peretz v. United States, III S. Ct.
2661, decision vacated reh'g denied, 944 F.2d 51 (1st Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied,
ll S. Ct. 2886 (1991).
176. Rule 52(b) sets forth the plain error doctrine: "Plain errors or defects affecting
substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of
the court." FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b). See suprv Section 1II. and accompanying text.
177. Rule 12 requires that certain objections be raised before trial or they are
deemed waived. FED. R. CniM. P. 12.
178. See sutpra Section III. and accompanying text.
179. FED. R. CRIM. P. 12(b).
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(1) Defenses and objections based on defects in the institution of the prose-
cution; or
(2) Defenses and objections based on defects in the indictment or information
(other than that it fails to show jurisdiction in the court or to charge an offense
which objections shall be noticed by the court at any time during the pendency of
the proceedings); or
(3) Motions to suppress evidence; or
(4) Requests for discovery under Rule 16; or
(5) Requests for a severance of charges or defendants under Rule 14.'"
Failure to raise an objection or defense that is within rule 12(b) has
significant consequences. Rule 12(f) provides that a failure to raise de-
fenses or objections "which must be made prior to trial ... shall con-
stitute waiver thereof, but the court for good cause shown may grant re-
lief from the waiver." 8 In this context, "waiver" means extinguishment,
such that the court can not consider the issue unless relief is granted
from the waiver.'82 This relief may only be granted for "cause," which
suggests that waivers are reviewable only in extreme circumstances.'
Thus, if double jeopardy claims are within Rule 12(f), they are extin-
guished if not raised within the time limits imposed by the rule.
1. Rule 12 Does Not Require A Defendant To Claim
Double Jeopardy Before Trial
Many courts of appeal rely on the conclusion that a double jeopardy
claim is encompassed by Rule 12(b) and, thus, must be made prior to
trial."' These courts reason that a claim of being tried twice is subject
180. As originally adopted in 1944, the rule (lid not include the provisions set forth
in subsections 3, 4, and 5. Nothing in the amendments, however, was intended to
change the substance of the provisions contained in subsections 1 and 2. See FED. R.
CRIM PROC. 12 advisory committee's note.
181. FED. R. CRIM. P. 12(f).
182. See Davis v. United States, 411 U.S. 233, 242 (1973).
183. Id. The Court has held that "cause" for granting relief from a waiver may ex-
ist, for example, where counsel was constitutionally ineffective, or when state inter-
ference prevented counsel from raising the claim in a timely manner. See Murray v.
Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986). In addition, if the legal basis for the claim was not
reasonably available to counsel, such might also constitute sufficient cause to justify
relief. Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 16 (1984). While Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989),
held that, ordinarily, "new rules" are not grounds for habeas petitioners to challenge
their convictions, new rules are generally applicable to persons whose cases are
pending on direct appeal. Id. at 310, 316; see also Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314,
328 (1987).
184. Many of the cases cited in notes 120-32, supra, rely on Rule 12(b). See, e.g.,
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to Rule 12(b)(1) or (2) because it is a defect in the institution of the
prosecution"a or in the indictment. " This conclusion is not without
some logical force."7
The drafters of the Rule, however, did not intend to include claims of
being tried twice within the mandatory provisions. Courts relying on Rule
12 have ignored the Advisory Committee's Note, which expressly state
that double jeopardy claims need not be made before trial, and are not
subject to waiver under Rule 12(f).' The Committee Notes explain that
defenses and objections should be divided into two groups. One group
includes "defenses and objections which must be raised by motion. Fail-
ure to do so constitutes a waiver."" The other group consists of de-
fenses and objections that may be raised on the defendant's motion.
Failure to do so, however, does not constitute a waiver. " Technical de-
fects in the proceedings or the indictment are included in the group that
must be raised on pain of waiver. '
Errors that are more substantive because they are jurisdictional, incur-
able, or both, need not be raised before trial.
In the other group of objections and defenses, which the defendant at his option
may raise by motion before trial, are included all defenses and objections which
are capable of determination without a trial of the general issue. They include
such matters as former jeopardy, former conviction, former acquittal, statute of
limitations, immunity, lack of jurisdiction, failure of indictment or information to
state an offense, etc. ' "
Paul v. Henderson, 698 F.2d 589, 592 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 835 (1983);
United States v. Scott, 464 F.2d 832, 833 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Grogan v. United States,
394 F.2d 287, 289 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 830 (1968).
185. FED. R. CRIM. P. 12(b)(1).
186. Id. at 12(b)(2).
187. See, e.g., Peter Westen, Away From Waiver: A Rationale for the Fofeiture of
Constitutional Rights in Criminal Procedure, 75 Micit. L. REV. 1214, 1250-51 (1977).
188. FED. R. CRIM. P. 12 advisory committee's note.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. The Notes explain:
In the first of these groups are included all defenses and objections that are
based on defects in the institution of the prosecution or in the indictment
and information, other than the lack of jurisdiction or failure to charge an of-
fense . . . . Among the defenses and objections in this group are the follow-
ing: Illegal selection or organization of the grand jury, disqualification of indi-
vidual grand jurors, presence of unauthorized persons in the grand jury room,
other irregularities in grand jury proceedings, defects in indictment or infor-
mation other than lack of jurisdiction or failure to state an offense, etc.
FED. R. CRIM P. 12 advisory committee's note.
192. FED. R. CRIM. P. 12 advisory committee's note.
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Thus, according to the Notes, claims of "former jeopardy, former convic-
tion [and] former acquittal" need not be raised before trial. ""
No case has explained why the Committee's understanding of Rule 12
should not be followed. The Supreme Court has repeatedly relied on the
Advisory Committee Notes in construing the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure." In Davis v. United States, the Supreme Court relied on
the 1944 Committee Notes to determine which kinds of pretrial motions
"are meant to be within the Rule's purview.""' Consequently, the Notes
appear to be controlling on this issue, and in light of Davis, there is no
reason to think that the Committee Notes inaccurately reflect the mean-
ing of the rule. "
193. Id. Authorities acknowledging the existence of the advisory committee's note
follow them. In United States v. Smith, 866 F.2d 1092, 1098 (9th Cir. 1989), United
States v. Brimberry, 744 F.2d 580, 586-87 (7th Cir. 1984), United States v. Garcia, 721
F.2d 721, 723 & n.3 (11th Cir. 1983), United States v. DeFillipo, 590 F.2d 1228, 1233
& n.3 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 920 (1979), and United States v. Young, 503
F.2d 1072, 1074 n.7 (3d Cir. 1974), the courts recognized that a double jeopardy
claim was not waived merely for failure to raise it before trial, relying on the advi-
sory committee's note. See also 2 MARK S. RHODES, ORFIELD'S CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
UNDER TIlE FEDERAL RuLEs, § 12:85 at 278-79 (1985); WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note
135, § 193 at 705; MOORE, supra note 135. 12.03[2] at 12-30; United States v.
Pelletier, 898 F.2d 297, 300 (2d Cir. 1990) (following that portion of the notes with
regard to an immunity claim). In United States v. Papadakis, 802 F.2d 618, 621 (2d
Cir. 1986); cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1092 (1987), the court acknowledged the advisory
committee's note and concluded that even if they were controlling, such does not
suggest that no motion at all is necessary and, thus, found a claim waived where no
motion was made during trial.
194. In a number of cases, the Court has cited the Notes and followed them as if
they were authoritative. See, e.g., United States v. Olano, 113 S. Ct. 1770. 1776 (1993)
(Rule 52(b)); Crosby v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 748, 752 (1993) (Rule 43); Depart-
ment of Justice v. Julian, 486 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1988) (Rule 32(c)); Young v. United States
ex rel. Vuitton et Fils, 481 U.S. 787. 794 n.6 (1987) (Rule 42(b)); United States v.
Gagnon, 470 U.S. 522, 529 (1985) (Rule 43); United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 15
n.12 (1985) (Rule 52(b)); United States v. Sells Eng'g, 463 U.S. 418, 428-29 (1983)
(Rule 6); United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 163 n.13 (1982) (Rule 52(b)); Arizona
v. Manypenny, 451 U.S. 232, 241 (1981) (Rule 54(b)); United States v. Nobles, 422
U.S. 225, 235 (1975) (Rule 16); Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 133 n.19 (1974)
(Rule 30); Dennis v. United States. 384 U.S. 855, 871 n.17 (1966) (Rule 16); cf.
Schiavone v. Fortune, 477 U.S. 21, 31 (1986) (stating that civil Advisory Committee's
Notes are "of weight" but not binding) (quoting Mississippi Pub. Co. v. Murphree, 326
U.S. 438, 444 (1946)).
195. Davis v. United States. 411 U.S. 233, 237-38 (1973) (holding that a challenge to
grand jury selection was subject to Rule 12(b)(1)).
196. There was also no indication that the rules were intended to continue the ef-
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The structure of 12(b)(1) and (2) supports the conclusion that double
jeopardy is not the kind of claim that need be raised before trial. All
errors subject to waiver under Rule 12(f) are easily cured and do not im-
plicate the fundamental power of the government to prosecute and pun-
ish a defendant. A formal defect in the composition of a grand jury, or in
an indictment, can generally be remedied without difficulty. For example,
a complaint about unauthorized persons in the grand jury room, or an
unsigned indictment, would almost certainly have been easily cured if
timely raised, and the proceedings would have continued without affect-
ing the outcome of the prosecution. Thus, a defendant who wishes to
raise such an issue for the first time on appeal is essentially asking for
reversal based on an error that was not prejudicial.
Those objections not subject to waiver pursuant to Rule 12 are differ-
ent. They are either fundamental defects, such as the failure of an indict-
ment to charge an offense, or they are not subject to cure by the prose-
cution (e.g., double jeopardy or the statute of limitations).
Some authorities, while admitting that, facially, the express waiver
provision of Rule 12(f) applies only to those claims that the rule requires
to be made before trial, suggest that Rule 12 "impliedly" requires the
claim to be made before conclusion of the trial."7 To the extent that a
fect of prior law. While the Advisory Committee's Notes expressly stated that the
waiver of the technical defects in the first group was intended to continue existing
practice there was no such statement as to the defenses in the second group. FED.
R. CRIM. P. 12 advisory committee's notes.
197. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 135, § 193 at 706, notes that "the rule itself is
silent on when they must be raised" but contends that "the sensible resolution is that
the [defenses] ... are waived if not raised at the trial." Moore recognizes that dou-
ble jeopardy claims need not be raised before trial, but contends they are waived if
not raised "at the proper time." MOORE, supra note 135, 1 12.0312] at 12-28 to 12-30;
see also United States v. Papadakis, 802 F.2d 618, 621 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied,
479 U.S. 1092 (1987). Professor Westen concludes that the rule creates not two but
three groups of claims: the group that must be raised before trial and is subject to
waiver under Rule 12(0; the group where the indictment fails to charge an offense,
which the rule says may be noticed at any time; and a residual group, including
double jeopardy, which must be raised at trial, or be waived. Westen, supra note
187, at 1250.
The rule does not explicitly state when these residual defenses must be as-
serted, but the relationship among the three classes implies that [they] ...
must be asserted before the end of trial .... The rule is also silent on the
consequences of the defendant's failure to make a timely assertion of defens-
es in this third class; it does not specify, as it does with the defenses in the
first class, that failure to assert them in a timely fashion 'shall constitute
waiver.' However, because it is implicit in the rule that a defendant must
raise these defenses before the end of trial, it is fair to assume that his fail-
ure to do so precludes him from asserting them later.
Id. at 1250 (citing 1 Charles A. Wright, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 193 at 410
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double jeopardy claim should be raised before trial, these authorities are
correct under generally applicable principles of contemporaneous ob-
jection embodied in Rule 51. " But the waiver does not result from op-
eration of Rule 12(f), which, on its face, applies only to the group of
claims that must be made before trial. "Expressio unius est exclusio
alterius."' Therefore, there is neither room nor justification to extend
the plain language of Rule 12(f) to claims which are not within its
ambit.
2 0
2. Rule 12 Does Not Require A Defendant To Claim
Multiplicity Before Trial
Virtually all cases holding that multiplicity claims are waived if not
raised at trial rely on Rule 12."' These courts hold that the failure to
object results in either preclusion of the claim on appeal or limitation of
the relief to vacation of a multiplicitous sentence, but not preclusion of
the otherwise jeopardy-barred "conviction" itself.'
(1969)).
None of these authorities, however, claim that Rule 12(f) causes the waiver. In-
stead, it appears that they rely on ordinary rules of contemporaneous objection and,
thus, they do not suggest that plain error analysis is prohibited.
198. FED. R. CRIM. P. 51.
199. Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Unit, 113 S. Ct. 1160, 1163 (1993)
("The expression of one thing excludes other things."). Chief Justice Rehnquist, writ-
ing for a unanimous Court, cited this maxim in support of the conclusion that the re-
quirement of pleading fraud with particularity, as imposed by Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 9(b), could not be extended to civil rights claims not expressly included in
the rule. Even though it might be sensible to require particularized pleading of civil
rights claims, "that is a result which must be obtained by the process of amending
the Federal Rules, and not by judicial interpretation." Id.
200. Furthermore, Rule 12(f) was designed to extinguish those rights that, if un-
timely asserted, would potentially cause undue disruption to pretrial proceedings. The
drafters apparently made a judgment that, as to other defenses, the ordinary require-
ments of Rules 51 and 52 were sufficient to balance the need for efficiency against
the unfairness to the defendant of permitting important defenses to be extinguished
through inattention.
Moreover, Rule 12 provides that one member of the group of defenses to which
double jeopardy belongs (failure of an indictment to charge an offense) may be
raised at any time. If one of the two specific deadlines in Rule 12 must be applied,
it would be logical to borrow the deadline applicable to the defense of failure to
charge an offense, rather than the deadline applicable to the other group.
201. See cases cited supra notes 151-66; see, e.g., United States v. Harris, 959 F.2d
246, 250 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (per curiam); United States v. Simone, 931 F.2d 1186, 1191-
92 (7th Cir. 1991); United States v. Sheehy, 541 F.2d 123, 130 (Ist Cir. 1976).
202. The compromise adopted by the cases cited supra notes 161-66, permitting the
1197
With few exceptions, the cases applying Rule 12 to multiplicity claims
simply assume that Rule 12 applies, rather than explaining why it gov-
erns. Where courts have applied the rule, they must have concluded that
multiplicity is within the rule, that is, that multiplicity is a "defense" or
"objection," which is "capable of being determined without the trial of
the general issue," and is "based on defects in the indictment" or "institu-
tion of the prosecution.". None of these assumptions, however, is cor-
rect.
Multiplicity is not a "defect" in an indictment. The Supreme Court has
repeatedly upheld prosecutions under a multiplicitous indictment." In
United States v. Universal C.. T. Credit Corp.," the Court explained
that a prosecutor could charge a single offense in multiple counts of an
indictment:
[A) draftsman of an indictment may charge crime in a variety of forms to avoid
fatal variance of the evidence. He may cast the indictment in several counts
whether the body of facts upon which the indictment is based gives rise to only
one criminal offense or to more than one. To be sure, the defendant may call
upon the prosecutor to elect or, by asking for a bill of particulars, to render the
various counts more specific. In any event, by an indictment of multiple counts
the prosecutor gives the necessary notice and does not do the less so because at
the conclusion of the Government's case the defendant may insist that all the
counts are merely variants of a single offense.?
The Supreme Court reaffirmed and elaborated on this rule in Ball v.
United States."7 In Ball, the prosecution charged the defendant, a con-
victed felon, with both possessing a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(h)(1), prohibiting felons from possessing firearms, and with receiv-
ing a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. app. § 1202(a)(1), prohibiting fel-
ons from receiving firearms. Because one could not receive a firearm
sentence to be vacated while the conviction itself is affirmed, is unsatisfactory. "In a
criminal case final judgment means sentence." Miller v. Aderhold, 288 U.S. 206, 210
(1933). Federal courts have no inherent power to "suspend" imposition of a sentence,
ex parte United States, 242 U.S. 27, 52 (1916), except as authorized under a specific
statute. See Mfronti v. United States, 350 U.S. 79. 80 (1955). Therefore, it would ap-
pear -to be, at a minimum, problematic to affirm a "conviction" on a charge with no
associated sentence. "Congress does not create criminal offenses having no sentencing
component." Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856, 861 (1985) (citations omitted).
203. FED. R. CRIM. P. 12 (b).
204. See, e.g., Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856. 865 (1985) (holding that a defen-
dant could properly be indicted for two counts even when he could stand convicted
of only one); United States v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 218, 224 (1952)
(finding that a prosecutor could draft an indictment charging a defendant with a
single offense in multiple counts).
205. 344 U.S. 218 (1952).
206. Id. at 225.
207. 470 U.S. 856 (1985).
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without possessing it, the offenses were the same under Blockburger."
Concluding that Congress did not intend multiple punishments for the
two separate offenses, the Court did not permit convictions on both
counts to stand.2m
The Court commented that no double jeopardy would result unless the
defendant was actually convicted for two counts for conduct that under
Blockburger constituted one offense."' The Court stated that "[ilt is
clear that a convicted felon may be prosecuted simultaneously for viola-
tions of §§ 922(h) and 1202(a) involving the same firearm. This Court has
long acknowledged the Government's broad discretion to conduct crimi-
nal prosecutions, including its power to select the charges to be brought
in a particular case.".. Thus, there was no defect or double jeopardy in
an indictment charging an unlawful act in two counts that could ulti-
mately lead to a conviction for only a single offense."'
The Court even held that both offenses should go to the jury."' The
district judge had the duty to address the multiplicitous nature of the
indictment only if and when the jury convicted the defendant of both
offenses."' The Ball Court reaffirmed that prosecution under a
multiplicitous indictment was part of the "Government's broad discretion
to conduct criminal prosecutions."" '
Other Supreme Court cases have also held that multiplicitous indict-
ments may be used and do not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause un-
less multiple convictions result.1 6 Ohio v. Johnson"' involved an in-
208. Ba//, 470 U.S. at 861-62.
209. Id. at 864-65.
210. Id. at 860 n.7
211. Id. at 859 (citing United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 382 (1982); Confisca-
tion Cases, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 454, 457-59 (1869)).
212. Id. at 860.
213. Id. at 865. "If, upon the trial, the district judge is satisfied that there is suf-
ficient proof to go to the jury on both counts, he should instruct the jury as to the
elements of each offense." Id.
214. Id. "Should the jury return guilty verdicts for each count, however, the district
court should enter judgment on only one of the statutory offenses." Id.
215. Id. at 859. Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment. He argued that even if
the majority was correct in holding that a simultaneous prosecution for both offenses
was constitutional, there was "no reason why [the] Court should go out of its way to
encourage prosecutors to tilt the scales of justice against the defendant by employing
such tactics." Id. at 867 (Stevens, J. concurring).
216. See, e.g., Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493, 500 (1984) ("While the Double Jeopar-
dy Clause may protect a defendant against cumulative punishments for convictions on
1199
dictment charging murder, aggravated robbery, and the lesser-included
offenses of involuntary manslaughter and grand theft.' The Court held
that it was not unconstitutional to prosecute a defendant for both the
lesser and greater crimes, even where the defendant could not be con-
victed and punished for both.19
Similarly, in United States v. Gaddis,"'  the Court held that there was
"no impropriety" for a grand jury to charge a defendant with violating
two different provisions of the federal bank robbery statutes, even where
the defendant ultimately could not stand convicted of both offenses."
In accord with the Supreme Court's position, Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 7(c)(1) permits multiplicitous indictments, even if only grudg-
ingly.Y According to the Advisory Committee's Note, the rule "is in-
tended to eliminate the use of multiple counts for the purpose of alleging
the commission of the offense by different means or in different
ways.""2 ' However, the Rule provides that different means or ways
"may" be alleged in the same count, thus disfavoring, but not prohibiting
multiplicitous indictments. 4
However, none of the cases requiring a pre-trial motion in order to
raise a multiplicity claim discuss these opinions. 5 The significance of
these cases is that a multiplicitous indictment is not "defective" because
the prosecutor has discretion to bring multiple charges even when, as a
matter of law, not all of them can result in convictions. Thus, Rule 12,
which on its face applies only to "defects," is not applicable. u6
the same offense, the Clause does not prohibit the State from prosecuting respondent
for such multiple offenses in a single prosecution."); United States v. Gaddis, 424 U.S.
544, 550 (1976) (determining that it was permissible to charge the defendant with
two crimes even when he could not be convicted of both).
217. 467 U.S. 493 (1984).
218. Id. at 495.
219. Id. at 500. "While the Double Jeopardy Clause may protect a defendant against
cumulative punishments for convictions on the same offense, the Clause does not
prohibit the State from prosecuting respondent for such multiple offenses in a single
proceeding." Id.
220. 424 U.S. 544 (1976).
221. Id. at 550.
222. FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(c)(1). Rule 7(c)(1) provides, in pertinent part: "It may be
alleged in a single count that the means by which the defendant committed the of-
fense are unknown or that the defendant committed it by one or more specified
means." Id.
223. FED. R. CRIM. P. 7 advisory committee's note.
224. See supra note 222.
225. See supra note 201.
226. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 12.
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3. Rule 12 Is Inapplicable To Multiplicity Claims Because
They Ordinarily Cannot Be Resolved Prior To A Verdict
A multiplicity objection is not ordinarily within Rule 12 because it is
not "capable of determination without trial of the general issue." 7 Even
where it appears that the government will not be entitled to judgment on
all counts, it will ordinarily be permitted to prove whichever counts it
can.
As the Supreme Court explained in United States v. Universal C.LT.
Credit Corp., whether charged acts are considered a single offense or
multiple offenses "may not be capable of ascertainment merely from the
bare allegations of an information and may have to await the trial on the
facts."" The Court's statement that an objection to multiplicity could
be made "at the conclusion of the Government's case""0 indicates that
the prosecution will be permitted to wait until the end of trial to elect
which counts to send to the jury or to have judgment entered upon. The
question of whether sufficient evidence exists to submit particular counts
to the jury will ordinarily require deferral until the conclusion of the
prosecution's case" because no summary judgment procedure exists in
the federal criminal system. Rarely will it be clear before trial that the
government cannot prove facts sufficient to convict on each count
charged.
Moreover, as the Supreme Court explained in Ball, to prosecute under
a multiplicitous indictment up to and including the jury's verdict does
not constitute double jeopardy. 2 The violation occurs only when a de-
227. Id. at 12(b).
228. 344 U.S. 218 (1952).
229. Id. at 225.
230. Id.
231. See, e.g., United States v. Maling, 737 F. Supp. 684, 697 (D. Mass. 1990) (deny-
ing motion to dismiss, reasoning that "[any objections concerning multiplicity may
properly be raised at or after trial"); United States v. Brown, 521 F. Supp. 511, 526
(W.D. Wis. 1981) ("[Dlefendant's multiplicity challenge should be reserved for decision
during or after trial . . . and when they can best be evaluated on the basis of the
evidence actually presented at trial."); United States v. Overbay, 444 F. Supp. 256,
258-59 (E.D. Tenn. 1977) (denying motion to dismiss, but noting that trial proof may
show fewer offenses than charged in the indictment); United States v. Allied Chem.
Corp., 420 F. Supp. 122, 124 (E.D. Va. 1976) (taking a motion to dismiss under ad-
visement because "[wihether the government has alleged separate and distinguishable
acts cannot be determined until the proof is offered").
232. Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856, 859-60 (1985).
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fendant is convicted and sentenced for two counts that are essentially
the same offense." Until the close of the government's case, it is im-
possible to know whether there is sufficient evidence to submit
multiplicitous counts to the jury. Even then, the possibility of harm is
contingent. Until the jury has rendered a verdict, it is impossible to know
whether the jury will convict on two or more counts that are the same
offense under law.'
A pre-trial motion to remedy any possible double jeopardy effect from
a multiplicitous indictment would be premature and unnecessary.", Fur-
thermore, dismissal is not a permissible remedy for a multiplicitous in-
dictment." A defendant faced with a multiplicitous indictment, for ex-
ample, one charging two distinct conspiracies, where the defendant con-
tends there is, at most, only one, could remedy the situation in a number
of ways. The defendant could move for an election at the close of the
evidence." Alternatively, he could argue to the jury that the evidence
shows, at most, a single conspiracy rather than two.' Further, the de-
fendant could request jury instructions explaining that a defendant can-
not be convicted of two violations of the same statute based on the same
facts.' Where the evidence does not support the existence of one of
233. Id. at 861.
234. See, e.g., United States v. Bums, 990 F.2d 1426, 1439 (4th Cir.) (finding an
acquittal of one of two multiplicitous counts to render multiplicity claim moot), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 2949 (1993); United States v. Wecker, 620 F. Supp. 1002, 1008 (D.
Del. 1985) (denying motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12 because defenses were
.contingent upon certain assumptions of fact").
235. In addition, it is inaccurate to think of a multiplicity claim as a "defense or
objection" to an indictment. According to Ball, the double jeopardy protection offered
by Blockburger is not that a defendant will not be prosecuted under a multiplicitous
indictment, but that the district court will enter a lawful judgment, one that does not
violate double jeopardy. Ball, 470 U.S. at 861. That expectation is not a defense,
because unlike a true defense, it is self-executing; a defendant is entitled to expect
that the judge will obey the law, even without a specific advance request. It is also
difficult to understand how a defendant could legitimately object to entirely proper
conduct on the part of the court and prosecutor.
236. See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 651 F.2d 1188, 1195 (6th Cir.) ("[Dlismissal
of the indictment is not the proper remedy for multiplicity"), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
875 (1981); United States v. Lace, 502 F. Supp. 1021, 1050 (D. Vt. 1980) (asserting
that "Idlismissal is an inappropriate remedy to cure multiplicity"), ffd, 669 F.2d 46
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 854 (1982). But see United States v. Beech-Nut Nutri-
tion Corp., 659 F. Supp. 1487, 1495 (E.D.N.Y. 1987) ("Before trial, a court may, in its
discretion, compel election between multiplicitous counts, if the mere making of the
charges would prejudice the defendants in the eyes of the jury.")
237. United States v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 218, 225 (1952).
238. Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 862-63 (1975) (recognizing that the Consti-
tution grants defendants the right to argue in summation to the jury); FED. R. CrIN.
P. 29.1 (granting defendants a right to closing argument).
239. FED. R. CRIM. P. 30 ("[A]ny party may file written requests that the court in-
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the conspiracies, the defendant could move for a judgment of acquit-
tal.24' Should the jury convict on both offenses and the defendant re-
main convinced that there was only one conspiracy, he could move that
judgment be entered on only one count.241 A defendant's right to argue
in summation to the jury, to request jury instructions, and to move for an
acquittal are undisputed fixtures of the law that do not require a motion
in advance.4 The defendant need not move before trial for an order to
take part in the trial as provided by the Federal Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure and the Constitution.243
4. Rule 12 Does Not Require Collateral Estoppel Claims To Be Made
Before Trial
Rule 12(b)(3) requires that motions to suppress evidence be made
before trial.244 The 1974 Advisory Committee Notes reveal that the pro-
vision is intended to apply to "objections to evidence on the ground that
struct the jury on the law as set forth in the requests."); see also I HON. LEONARD
SAND et al., MODERN FEDERAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CRIMINAL 19.01 at 19-24 to 19-34.1
(1992) (including pattern instruction and commentary for instructing jury where defen-
dant contends that a single conspiracy has been pleaded as multiple conspiracies).
240. FED. R. CRIM. P. 29(a) (providing for motion for judgment of acquittal where
evidence is legally insufficient on one or more counts).
241. FED. R. CRIM. P. 29(c) (providing that motion for judgment of acquittal may be
made or renewed within seven days of discharge of the jury, or at such further time
as the court may order within the seven day period).
242. See supra notes 23841.
243. This is not to say that the multiplicity doctrine is wholly without substance.
There are cases that hold that a court may take steps to reduce trial prejudice re-
sulting from a factually multiplicitous indictment, such as election at the end of the
government's case, a jury instruction, or vacation of a jeopardy-barred conviction. See
supra notes 23741 and accompanying text.
Those steps, however, do not include dismissal of the indictment. See supra note
236 and accompanying text. Failure to request the court to take steps mitigating prej-
udice at trial from a multiplicitous indictment should not deprive a defendant of a
remedy for the entirely separate harm of illegal multiple sentences. United States v.
Morehead, 959 F.2d 1489, 1506 n.ll (10th Cir.), adhered to on other grounds sub
nom., United States v. Hill, 971 F.2d 1461 (10th Cir. 1992) (en banc); LAFAVE & ISRA-
EL, supra note 26, § 19.3. The court may have discretion to force election, or con-
solidate counts where a count is factually multiplicitous. E.g. United States v.
Sanchez-Lopez, 879 F.2d 541, 549-50 (9th Cir. 1989). However, Ball suggests that a
district court does not have discretion to consolidate counts under a legally
multiplicitous indictment. See supra notes 207-15 and accompanying text.
244. FED. R. CRIM. P. 12(b)(3).
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it was illegally obtained."' 4 Thus, it applies to "application of the
exclusionary rule of evidence." 46 Rule 12(b)(3), however, does not ap-
pear to have to have been intended to apply to claims of collateral estop-
pel since collateral estoppel operates to preclude proof of a fact, not to
suppress any particular evidence.
In short, Rule 12(b) does not require that a defense based on the con-
stitutional prohibition against double jeopardy be raised before trial.
Accordingly, the waiver provision of Rule 12(f) provides no basis for
refusing to consider double jeopardy claims for plain error under Rule
52(b). 47
B. The Majority Of Courts Holding That Double Jeopardy Claims
Cannot Be Reviewed For The First Time On Appeal Hold That The
Claims Were "Waived," But Do Not Apply The Law Regarding
Waiver Of Constitutional Rights
Opinions holding double jeopardy claims waived if not raised at trial
contain virtually no analysis other than citation to prior authority. No
case fully explains why Rule 52(b) should not be applied, other than ritu-
alistically repeating that the lack of objection constitutes a waiver.
In equating "failure to object" with a "waiver of rights," the courts
following the rule of waiver are at odds with the very concept of plain
error review under Rule 52(b). As the Supreme Court explained in Unit-
ed States v. Olano,"8 a right that has been waived is extinguished and,
therefore, is not subject to plain error review."' Rule 52(b), on the oth-
er hand, provides an avenue for review of errors "not brought to the at-
tention of the court.1
250
Thus, strict adherence to the rule of waiver for failure to object would
render Rule 52(b) meaningless. If failure to object is considered a waiver,
and waived claims are not subject to review, even for plain error, then
no category of error is subject to plain error review. Such a construction
contravenes the clear intent of Rule 52(b). The Supreme Court's analysis
in Olano clearly indicates that a failure to raise a timely objection does
245. FED. R. CRIM. P. 12(b)(3) advisory committee's note.
246. Id.
247. FED. R. CIM. P. 12(f) (stating that failure to raise defense prior to trial consti-
tutes waiver); FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b) ("[Pilain errors ... affecting substantial rights
may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the court.").
248. 113 S. Ct. 1770, 1777 (1993) (explaining that, as a hypothetical example, it
would not be error not to conduct a trial if a defendant validly waived her right to
trial by pleading guilty).
249. Id.
250. FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b).
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not constitute a waiver rendering Rule 52(b) inapplicable: "If a legal rule
was violated during the District Court proceedings, and if the defendant
did not waive the rule, then there has been an 'error' within the meaning
of Rule 52(b) despite the absence of a timely objection. " "n
In addition, non-constitutional issues may be reviewed for plain er-
ror.' The end result is that courts treat claims based on constitutional
double jeopardy grounds with less deference than non-constitutional
claims that are reviewable for plain error. Nothing in Rule 52(b) singles
out double jeopardy, or any other specific kind of error, for disfavored
treatment.
The conclusion that mete failure to object constitutes a waiver extin-
guishing the right is precluded by the standard established by the Su-
preme Court for waiver of constitutional rights. In Johnson v. Zerbst,2"
the defendant was convicted after a trial in which he was not represent-
ed by counsel. On habeas corpus, the defendant contended that his trial
without representation was unconstitutional. The government argued that
the defendant waived his right, if any, by failing to object or request
counsel."M The Court noted that "'courts indulge every reasonable pre-
sumption against waiver' of fundamental constitutional rights251 and that
we 'do not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights."'""
The Court concluded that "[a] waiver is ordinarily an intentional relin-
251. Olano, 113 S. Ct. at 1777. For a general discussion on the distinction between
waiver and forfeiture, see Paul T. Wangerin, "Plain Error" And "Fundamental Fair-
ness": Toward A Definition Of Exceptions To The Rules Of Procedural Default, 29
DEPAUL L. REV. 753, 757-58 (1980).
252. See, e.g., United States v. Santana-Camacho, 833 F.2d 371, 374-75 (1st Cir.
1987) (holding that prosecutor's misrepresentations made during closing argument
constituted plain error); United States v. Silverstein, 732 F.2d 1338, 1349 (7th Cir.
1984) (setting forth the plain error test in a case involving the court's response to a
jury note), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1111 (1985). "To be plain, an error must be conspic-
uous, at least in hindsight[;] . . . it must also be an error that probably changed the
outcome of the trial . . . ." Id. at 1349. "Reversing a conviction on the basis of an
error that the defendant's lawyer failed to bring to the judge's attention" is "justifi-
able only when the reviewing court is convinced that it is necessary in order to
avert an actual miscarriage of justice .... " Id.
253. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
254. Id. at 464.
255. Id. (citing Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 301 U.S. 389, 393 (1937); Hodges v.
Easton, 106 U.S. 408, 412 (1882)).
256. Johnson, 304 U.S. at 464 (citing Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 301
U.S. 292 (1937)).
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quishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege. " 2"7 Thus, the
defendant was permitted to raise the issue on appeal despite his lack of
objection at trial because it did not appear on the record that he had
waived his right to counsel under that standard.'
In Green v. United States,'"1 the Court specifically applied the John-
son standard to a double jeopardy claim." In Green, the jury was given
the option of convicting the defendant of either first or second degree
murder." ' After being convicted of second degree murder, the defen-
dant successfully appealed and, over his objection, was retried for first
degree murder."z The defendant was convicted of first degree murder
at the second trial." The state argued that Green waived his double
jeopardy defense to the first degree murder charge by successfully ap-
pealing the second degree murder conviction.'z The Court rejected the
government's position:
[W]e cannot accept this paradoxical contention. "Waiver" is a vague term used for
a great variety of purposes, good and bad, in the law. In any normal sense, howev-
er, it connotes some kind of voluntary knowing relinquishment of a right.'
In subsequent cases, the Court has consistently required a Johnson v.
Zerbst waiver of a double jeopardy claim. In Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte," the Court observed that "the requirement of a knowing
and intelligent waiver has been applied only to those rights which the
Constitution guarantees to a criminal defendant in order to preserve a
fair trial." 7 The Court further noted that "the Johnson criteria [are ap-
plied] to assess the effectiveness of a waiver of ... the right to be free
from twice being placed in jeopardy."2 1
Similarly, in Menna v. New York,269 the Court held that the defendant
had not waived the right to appeal his conviction on charges barred by
the Double Jeopardy Clause even when he had entered a guilty plea to
the charges.27 In noting that a counseled "plea of guilty to a charge
257. Id.; accord Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 633 (1986).
258. Johnson, 304 U.S. at 468.
259. 355 U.S. 184 (1957).
260. Id. at 191-92.
261. Id. at 186.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 191.
265. Id. at 191 (citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938)).
266. 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
267. Id. at 237.
268. Id. at 237-38 (citing Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957)).
269. 423 U.S. 61 (1975) (per curiam).
270. Id. at 62.
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does not waive a claim that-judged on its face-the charge is one
which the State may not constitutionally prosecute,""7 ' the Court distin-
guished Tollett v. Henderson,2"2 McMann v. Richardson"n and Brady
v. United States,"4 cases holding that a defendant could not raise
claims of antecedent deprivation of constitutional rights following a
knowing, voluntary, and intelligent plea of guilty. 7' The Court explained
that those cases recognized a plea of guilty as "remov[ing] the issue of
factual guilt from the case."27"' It further explained that in Green, the
claim [was] that the State may not convict petitioner no matter how
validly his factual guilt is established."77 The guilty plea, therefore, does
not bar the claim.27 Other cases suggest that double jeopardy claims
are entitled to special consideration because they bar prosecution entire-
ly. 
27
271. Id. at 62 n.2.
272. 411 U.S. 258 (1973).
273. 397 U.S. 759 (1970).
274. 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
275. In Tollett, the Court held that a defendant who pleaded guilty was not entitled
to habeas corpus relief because the grand jury that indicted him was unconstitutional-
ly selected. Tollett, 411 U.S. at 266. In McMann, the Court held that a guilty plea
induced by a coerced confession was not involuntary, even though there was no pro-
cedure by which to test the voluntariness of the confession in advance of trial.
McMann, 397 U.S. at 771-72. In Brady, the Court held that a guilty plea was not
involuntary when made to avoid a death sentence under a penalty provision later
held unconstitutional. Brady, 397 U.S. at 755-56.
276. Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 62 n.2 (1975).
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. In Robinson v. Neil, 409 U.S. 505, 511 (1973), the Court held that Waller v.
Florida, 397 U.S. 387, 395 (1970), which held that a state and municipality were the
same sovereign for double jeopardy purposes, would be "accorded full retroactive
effect." The Court distinguished Waller from prior court decisions clarifying important
rights that were not applied retroactively because it related to double jeopardy.
"While this guarantee, like the others, is a constitutional right of the criminal defen-
dant, its practical result is to prevent a trial from taking place at all, rather than to
prescribe procedural rules that govern the conduct of a trial." Id. at 509.
Similarly, in Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974), the defendant claimed that
he had been vindictively prosecuted for a felony after successfully appealing a misde-
meanor conviction for the same offense. Distinguishing McMann, Brady, and Tollett,
the Court reasoned that even though the defendant pleaded guilty to the felony in
superior court, the protection offered by the Due Process Clause barred the convic-
tion. Id. at 29-31. The Court explained that the right not to be vindictively prosecut-
ed, like the right not to be placed twice in jeopardy, was "distinctive" because "'its
practical result is to prevent a trial from taking place at all, rather than to prescribe
Many of the courts holding or implying that a double jeopardy defense
may be raised on appeal despite failure to appropriately object before or
at trial rely on Johnson v. Zerbst."' Similarly, courts calling the rule of
waiver into question rely on the problematic nature of a policy of auto-
matic waiver in light of these cases."' Further research has presented
procedural rules that govern the conduct of a trial."' Id. at 31 (quoting Robinson, 409
U.S. at 509).
280. See United States v. Jarvis, 7 F.3d 404, 412 (4th Cir. 1993) (concluding that
failure to raise a formal objection at pleading or trial does not constitute waiver on
appeal), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1200 (1994); United States v. Devine, 934 F.2d 1325,
1343 (5th Cir. 1991) (same), reh'g en banc denied, 943 F.2d 1315 (5th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 112 S. Ct. 349 (1991), and cert. denied. 112 S. Ct. 911, and cert. denied, 112 S.
Ct. 952, and cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 954, and cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1164, and cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 1197 (1992); United States v. Rivera, 872 F.2d 507, 509 (1st Cir.)
(same), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 818 (1989); United States v. Anderson, 514 F.2d 583,
586 (7th Cir. 1975) (recognizing waiver as the intentional abandonment of a known
right).
Other courts have also recognized that a Johnson v. Zerbst waiver of protection
against double jeopardy is required. See United States v. Hudson, 14 F.3d 536, 539
(10th Cir. 1994) (waiver of double jeopardy rights must be voluntary and intelligent);
United States v. Rodriguez, 995 F.2d 234, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 13364, at *1 (9th Cir.
1993) (concluding that without a knowing and voluntary waiver, mistrial not based on
"manifest necessity" will bar retrial); United States v. Atkins, 834 F.2d 426, 437 & n.9
(5th Cir. 1987) (stating that a deliberate decision to forego the right is required),
overruled in part by Taylor v. Whitley, 933 F.2d 325, 327 (5th Cir. 1991) (acknowl-
edging as binding authority, United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563 (1989)), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 1678 (1992); Adamson v. Ricketts, 789 F.2d 722, 737 (9th Cir. 1986) (argu-
ing that a double jeopardy claim is subject to rule that waiver requires intentional
relinquishment of a known right, but contending that there had been such a waiver)
(Brunetti, J., joined by Kennedy, Alarcon & Beezer, JJ., dissenting from en banc opin-
ion), rev'd, 483 U.S. 1 (1987); Lydon v. Justices of Boston Mun. Court, 698 F.2d 1, 9-
10 (1st Cir. 1982) (waiver of double jeopardy claim requires intentional relinquishment
of a known right), rev'd on other grounds, 466 U.S. 294 (1984); Hartung v. Omodt,
687 F.2d 1230, 1234 (8th Cir. 1982) (implicitly requiring voluntary waiver of double
jeopardy claim, but finding waiver sufficient); United States v. Rich, 589 F.2d 1025,
1032-33 (10th Cir. 1978) (reiterating that the constitutional right not to be placed
twice in jeopardy for the same offense requires a "knowing and intelligent" waiver);
Launius v. United States, 575 F.2d 770, 772 (9th Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (same); Unit-
ed States v. Young, 503 F.2d 1072, 1075 (3d Cir. 1974) (same); Himmelfarb v. United
States, 175 F.2d 924, 931 n.1 (9th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 860 (1949).
281. United States v. MacQueen, 596 F.2d 76, 81 (2d Cir. 1979) (citing Menna v.
New York and Blackledge v. Perry, which "indicate that the right not to be haled into
court twice for the same offense is a fundamental one, so important that it cannot
be waived by a guilty plea to a second charge"); Parker v. United States, 507 F.2d
587, 588 (8th Cir. 1974) (noting that "[tihe question of whether counsel is empowered
to effectively waive the double jeopardy defense without his client's knowledge [by
failing to object] is a difficult one which we leave to a future decision"), cert. de-
nied, 421 U.S. 916 (1975); Douglas v. Nixon, 459 F.2d 325, 327 (6th Cir.) (concluding
that "whether time and intervening decisions of the Supreme Court have eroded" the
rule of waiver is a moot question because the court found the double jeopardy issue
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no federal court decisions that expressly hold that the Johnson v. Zerbst
analysis is inapplicable to double jeopardy claims.
In United States v. Broce, 2 however, the Supreme Court held that
when the defendants entered guilty pleas to two counts of an indictment,
they were foreclosed from arguing that they had in fact committed only
one offense.' Arguably, Broce could be read as limiting Johnson v.
Zerbst in a guilty plea context. However, when fairly read, Broce does
not limit Johnson, but continues to allow plain error review. The Court
was reasonably clear that its rationale was not that a double jeopardy
claim had been waived, but that the defendants would not be permitted
to contradict the judicial admissions inherent in a valid plea to two of-
fenses:
Just as a defendant who pleads guilty to a single count admits guilt to the spec-
ified offense, so too does a defendant who pleads guilty to two counts with facial
allegations of distinct offenses concede that he has committed two separate
crimes .... When respondents pleaded guilty to two charges of conspiracy on the
explicit premise of two agreements which started at different times and embraced
separate objectives, they conceded guilt to two separate offenses.'
This could be interpreted as an application of settled principles of law,
such that a defense argument on appeal must be founded in the record
and judicial admissions are binding and non-controvertible.'
The Court noted, however, that a double jeopardy claim would still be
viable, even after a guilty plea, if it did not require impeachment of the
defendant's plea.' The Court explained that exceptions to the rule that
a voluntary guilty plea forecloses attack on the conviction existed "where
on the face of the record the court had no power to enter the conviction
or impose the sentence. '' "? The Court cited Menna as one of those ex-
ceptions, noting that in Menna "the indictment was facially duplicative of
the earlier offense of which the defendant had been convicted and sen-
meritless), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1010 (1972).
282. 488 U.S. 563 (1989).
283. Id. at 576.
284. Id. at 570-71.
285. See, e.g., 9 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2590 at 882 (Chadbourne rev.
ed. 1981) ("The vital feature of a judicial admission is universally conceded to be its
conclusiveness upon the party making it; i.e., the prohibition of any further dispute of
the fact by him and of any use of evidence to disprove or contradict it.").
286. Broce, 488 U.S. at 569.
287. Id. at 569, 576.
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tenced. ... "" Accordingly, courts applying Broce have held that if the
record itself demonstrates that the counts were multiplicitous, a double
jeopardy challenge would be cognizable. '
C. Where Did The Federal Courts Go Wrong?
This article contends that many federal courts have been fundamental-
ly misapplying the law. Analysis of cases applying the rule of waiver
suggests two possible explanations for the apparently erroneous appli-
cation of the law. First, the courts have never incorporated changes in
the law arising after the rule of waiver was formulated; instead, they
appear unaware of their own precedents. Second, many courts claiming
to apply the rule of waiver proceed to analyze the claims anyway, sug-
gesting that they may actually be applying a form of plain error analysis
without expressly acknowledging it.
1. Were The Courts Of Appeals Unaware Of Relevant Decisions?
The cases suggest a lack of judicial communication, both within indi-
vidual circuits and between the courts of appeals and the Supreme
Court. The rule of waiver was established in the federal courts in 1925 in
Levin v. United States,' which held that "waiver may be either express
or implied [and] it is always implied when there is failure to raise the
objection at the first opportunity."" That conclusion may have been
correct at the time. However, the rule warranted some reevaluation after
the Court's decision in Johnson v. Zerbst in 1938 and, again, after the
codification of the plain error doctrine in the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure in 1944." ' Subsequently, Green v. United States" in 1957,
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte"5 in 1973, and Menna v. New York"a in
288. Id. at 575-76 (citing Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 62 (1975)).
289. See, e.g., United States v. Pollen, 978 F.2d 78, 84 (3d Cir. 1992) (double jeopar-
dy claim may be raised after guilty plea if it "can be proven by reference solely to
the indictment and existing record") (citing Broce, 488 U.S. at 574-76), cert. denied,
113 S. Ct. 2332 (1993), and cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 697 (1994); United States v. Kai-
ser, 893 F.2d 1300, 1302 (11th Cir. 1990) (reviewing double jeopardy claim after guilty
plea because it was apparent from the face of the record).
290. 5 F.2d 598 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 269 U.S. 562 (1925). The rule was
apparently first applied in a federal court in Miller v. United States, 41 App. D.C. 52.
62, cert. denied, 231 U.S. 755 (1913), but Miller has not been cited by other federal
courts for the proposition.
291. Levin, 5 F.2d at 600.
292. 304 U.S. 458 (1938) (stating that a waiver must be knowing and voluntary).
293. FED. R. CRIM. P. 52.
294. 355 U.S. 184, 191 (1957) (waiver of double jeopardy claim requires knowing
and voluntary relinquishment of the right).
295. 412 U.S. 218, 236-38 (1973) (requirement of knowing and voluntary waiver ap-
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1975 shed further light on the issue. The courts of appeals, however, did
not attempt to reconcile these decisions or the Advisory Committee
Notes when holding that double jeopardy claims are waived if not raised
before trial. Instead, the courts tended to continue following their own
precedents and those of other circuits.
United States v. Rivera, 7 one of the few cases to hold that claims of
being tried twice are subject to plain error review, makes this
observation."8 In Rivera, the First Circuit cited some of the numerous
cases that have applied the rule of waiver, but indicated that no decision
"persuasively addresses the principle that a waiver of a constitutional
right must be 'voluntary, knowing, [and] intelligent."'" There may be a
response to the Supreme Court cases, but no court applying the rule of
waiver has made one."
One court has even suggested that some of the responsibility for the
failure of the circuits to confront the applicability of Johnson v. Zerbst
and its progeny to double jeopardy claims rests with defense counsel. :"
In United States v. MacQueen,2 a 1979 decision, the Second Circuit
declined to state that the rule of waiver was still valid." In attempting
to explain why the rule of waiver had never been reevaluated in light of
subsequent Supreme Court cases, the court remarked that United States
v. Perez,' a 1977 case following the rule of waiver, "was decided after
Blackledge and Menna, but it does not distinguish them and those cases
were not called to the panel's attention. "'5
plies to double jeopardy claim).
296. 423 U.S. 61, 62 (1975) (per curiam) (concluding that defendant's guilty plea did
not waive the right to raise double jeopardy claim).
297. 872 F.2d 507, 509 (1st Cir.) (holding that defendant's failure to plead double
jeopardy did not constitute a knowing waiver), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 818 (1989).
298. Id.
299. Id. (quoting United States v. Christian, 571 F.2d 64, 69 (1st Cir. 1978)
(discussing requirements for waiver of fundamental constitutional rights)).
300. See supra notes 253-79 and accompanying text.
301. United States v. MacQueen, 596 F.2d 76, 81 (2d Cir. 1979) (discussing defense
counsel's double jeopardy argument on appeal in United States v. Perez, 565 F.2d
1227 (2d Cir. 1977)).
302. Id.
303. Id. at 82 (concluding that a defendant did not suffer double jeopardy when
case was retried after mistrial).
304. 565 F.2d 1227, 1232 (2d Cir. 1977) (stating that the defendant must raise the
issue of double jeopardy to avoid waiver).
305. MacQueen, 596 F.2d at 81; see Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61 (1975) (per
The explanation that these courts were applying the "law of the cir-
cuit," unaware of subsequent Supreme Court cases, is incomplete simply
because there is a significant disparity of outcomes within the individual
circuits." ' The Second Circuit provides a good example. In United
States v. Private Brands, 7 a 1957 case, the Second Circuit held that a
failure to raise a multiplicity objection before trial constituted a waiv-
er."' Without mentioning Private Brands, the court in Natarelli v.
United States,: "' a 1975 case, went the other way, holding that challeng-
es to multiplicitous sentences could be attacked for the first time on
post-conviction review. " ' Four years later, in United States v.
DiGeronimo,"' the court found that a conviction on two counts that in
law are the same offense could be remedied on direct appeal as plain er-
ror.":  The next year, however, in United States v. Alessi,"' a panel
held that appellants were "barred by their procedural default from rais-
ing" the claim for the first time on appeal without mentioning the prior
case law."" Then, in 1981, in United States v. Reed," again without
mentioning the court's prior pronouncements on the issue, the Second
Circuit rejected the Alessi approach, stating that "[tihe principal danger
in multiplicity-that the defendant will be given multiple sentences for
the same offense-can be remedied at any time by merging the convic-
curiam); Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974).
306. "In the case of a court that sits in panels, a decision of a panel constitutes a
decision of the court and carries the weight of stare decisis in a subsequent case
before the same or different panel. MOORE, supra note 135, at 0.402[1], at 19.
Based on this principle, the federal courts of appeals consider prior panel decisions
binding "law of the circuit" unless overruled by the court sitting en banc or by the
Supreme Court. See, e.g., Broderick v. Roache, 996 F.2d 1294, 1298 (1st Cir. 1993) (in
a multi-panel circuit, new panels are bound by prior decisions on point); United
States v. Hogan, 986 F.2d 1364, 1369 (11th Cir. 1993) (panels are bound by prior
panel decisions, unless the holding is overruled en banc or by the Supreme Court);
United States v. Ruff, 984 F.2d 635, 640 (5th Cir. 1993) (same), cert. denied, 114 S.
Ct. 108 (1993); Lomas Mortgage USA v. Wiese, 980 F.2d 1279, 1282 (9th Cir. 1992)
(same), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 2925 (1993); Kronfeld v. TWA, 832 F.2d 726, 732 n.13
(2d Cir. 1987) (same), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1007 (1988).
307. 250 F.2d 554 (2d Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 957 (1958), overruled in
part on other grounds by United States v. Plattner. 330 F.2d 271, 277 (2d Cir. 1964).
308. Id. at 557 (citing Anderson v. United States, 189 F.2d 202, 204 (6th Cir. 1951)).
309. 516 F.2d 149 (2d Cir. 1975).
310. Id. at 152 n.4.
311. 598 F.2d 746 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 886 (1979).
312. Id. at 751-52.
313. 638 F.2d 466, 476 (2d Cir. 1980) (citing FED. R. CRIM. P. 12(0).
314. Id. at 476.
315. 639 F.2d 896 (2d Cir. 1981).
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tions and permitting only a single sentence.""' The 1991 case of United
States v. Coiro"7 set aside a multiplicitous conviction as plain error. :"
The Seventh Circuit has similarly waffled. In a 1979 case, United States
v. Stavros.." the court reviewed a multiplicity claim raised for the first
time on appeal and concluded that "[i]f a plain constitutional infirmity in
a criminal sentence has come to our attention, we think we should not
disregard it."" Six years later, in United States v. Griffin,2' the court
held that Rule 12 required claims of multiplicity to be raised before trial,
and therefore, they could not be raised under the plain error standard
absent a showing of cause. Griffin was followed by another panel's
decision a year later."' In the 1989 case, United States v. Podell,2- a
panel implicitly declined to follow Griffin, and reversed for plain error,
even though there was no analysis or specific finding of "cause."' A
1990 case followed Podell's analysis. :' The following year, in United
States v. Simone, the Seventh Circuit cited Podell, but reverted to the
Griffin test, requiring a finding of "cause" before it would consider the
issue on appeal. -" Yet, in United States v. Bailin," a 1992 case, the
court cited Podell approvingly for the proposition that double jeopardy
violations were sometimes plain error,:"' while another panel went the
316. Id. at 904 n.6 (citing 1 CIIARLES A. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDIJRE
§ 145 (1969)).
317. 922 F.2d 1008 (2d Cir. 1991).
318. Coiro, 922 F.2d at 1013-15 (citing United States v. Reed, 639 F.2d 896 (2d Cir.
1981)), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2826 (1991).
319. 597 F.2d 108 (7th Cir. 1979).
320. Id. at 111.
321. 765 F.2d 677 (7th Cir. 1985).
322. Id. at 681-82. The defendant's task became even more daunting in that he did
not raise the issue on direct appeal; instead, he waited until the § 2255 petition. Id.
at 682.
323. United States v. Mosley, 786 F.2d 1330, 1333 (7th Cir.) (stating that a claim of
multiplicity is waived if not raised before trial), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1184 (1986).
324. 869 F.2d 328 (7th Cir. 1989).
325. Id. at 331-32.
326. United States v. Briscoe, 896 F.2d 1476, 1522 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S.
863 (1990).
327. 931 F.2d 1186 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 584 (1991).
328. Id. at 1192 & n.6.
329. 977 F.2d 270 (7th Cir. 1992).
330. Id. at 282 n. 18.
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other way that same year." Other circuits occasionally appear unaware
of their prior precedent as well.32
2. The Circuit Courts May Be Applying Plain Error Analysis Under
A Different Name
One possible reconciliation of these inconsistent decisions may be that
the courts are really applying plain error analysis, or its equivalent, with-
out specifically saying so. Many of the cases holding double jeopardy
claims waived because the issue was not raised below analyze the double
jeopardy claims despite their putative adherence to the rule of waiver.
For instance, the Eighth Circuit was an early follower of the rule of waiv-
er,"' but in Parker v. United States,' the court gave an illuminating
commentary on the circuit's prior cases:
The waiver "rule" may not be as absolute as we have stated it. Where we have
purported to apply it, we have alternatively held that there was no double jeopar-
dy,... reversed the conviction on other grounds, . . . or noted that the issue was
still open to the petitioner in state court.:"
In Parker, the court found that it did not have to decide the issue raised
because the substantive double jeopardy issue was meritless)u"
Similarly, in Virgin Islands v. Smith, 7 the Third Circuit reached a
double jeopardy claim as plain error, observing that many courts have
held that the failure to raise a constitutional claim at trial precludes rais-
ing the issue on appeal." "In doing so, however, these courts have,
nevertheless, proceeded to consider and decide the asserted constitution-
al guarantee claim." "' Examination of the cases, involving both claims
331. United States v. Wilson, 962 F.2d 621, 626 (7th Cir. 1992).
332. For example, in United States v. Harris. 959 F.2d 246, 250 (D.C. Cir.) (per
curiam) ((Ruth Bader) Ginsburg, Thomas and Silberman, JJ.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
362, and cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 364 (1992), the court rejected a multiplicity claim
because the defendant did not raise it until midway through the trial. The court sur-
veyed the law in other circuits, as if reviewability of multiplicity claims were an
open question in the circuit. Id. Two years earlier, however, in United States v. John-
son, 909 F.2d 1517 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (Opinion of Buckley, J. with Ginsburg and Wil-
liams, JJ. joining), the court reached the issue when it had been raised even 'later, in
a post-trial motion in the district court. Id. at 1519. The court in Har'is did not
mention Johnson.
333. See cases cited supra, note 127.
334. 507 F.2d 587 (8th Cit. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 916 (1975).
335. Id. at 588 n.1.
336. Id. at 588-59.
337. 445 F.2d 1089 (3d Cir. 1971).
338. Id. at 1094.
339. Id.
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of being tried twice and of multiplicity, reveals that, in most instances,
the courts concluded that the double jeopardy claims were meritless.""
In actuality, what many courts may have been doing, distinct from
what they said they were doing, is engaging in the equivalent of a plain
error analysis. The courts' rote re-statement of the rule of waiver in the
opinions may be viewed as tantamount to an affirmance of the principle
that any alleged error must be raised at trial; otherwise, it will be review-
able on appeal solely for plain error. When the court then proceeds to
analyze a double jeopardy claim raised for the first time on appeal and
finds it meritless, it is in essence performing plain error analysis. Where
the court finds no violation of double jeopardy, there is no plain error.
This hypothesis is sufficient to explain the multiplicity cases in the
Second and Seventh Circuits discussed above." In the cases where the
court reached the merits and found the double jeopardy claim to be
meritless, the court pronounced that the rule of waiver barred further
consideration of the claim. Where the claim was meritorious, the court
reversed in spite of the rule of waiver bar.:"2
340. In the cases cited supra notes 120-32, where a double jeopardy issue was pre-
sented, the courts found the double jeopardy claim meritless, except in the cases dis-
cussed infra notes 345-46. Similarly, in the multiplicity cases cited supra notes 151-
60, excluding those cases cited i'rfo note 344, the court either rejected the claim on
the merits, or noted that concurrent sentences had been imposed. (Traditionally, the
fact that the sentence on a challenged count ran concurrently with that of a valid
count was an independent basis for an appellate court to decline to reach even a
duly preserved appellate claim). See, e.g., United States v. Romano, 382 U.S. 136, 138
(1965). This approach was rejected in Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856, 864-65
(1985)).
341. See supra notes 307-31 and accompanying text.
342. In two Seventh Circuit cases, the court did not reach the merits, but it was
clear in each that the claim would have been unavailing. In United States v. Mosley,
786 F.2d 1330 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1184 (1986), the defendant claimed
that his conviction for one count of conspiracy and one count of interstate transpor-
tation of a stolen security was multiplicitous. Id. at 1333. However, conspiracy and a
substantive offense may be charged and punished separately, so this claim was emp-
ty. See, e.g., United States v. Felix, 112 S. Ct. 1377, 1384-85 (1992). In United States
v. Wilson, 962 F.2d 621 (7th Cir. 1992), the court refused to decide whether a felon
could, for the same act, be convicted under both 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), prohibiting fel-
ons from possessing firearms, and 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), imposing a significant manda-
tory minimum sentence on persons with three or more prior convictions for certain
kinds of felonies when convicted of a violation of § 922(g). Id. at 626. In an earlier
case, United States v. Garrett, 903 F.2d 1105, 1113 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S.
905 (1990), the court held that there was no double jeopardy where the defendant
was convicted under both § 922(g) and § 924. Hence, in the Seventh Circuit, the
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If this hypothesis is correct, the failure of the courts to account for the
Johnson v. Zerbst line of cases becomes much more comprehensible.
The courts may recognize that the claims are not "waived" in the sense
that they are extinguished, but simply that they were not properly object-
ed to and, thus, are reviewable only for plain error.' If so, there is no
doctrinal inconsistency between the Supreme Court and the approach
taken by the circuit courts.
If the courts engage in plain error analysis without admitting so, the
harm from such imprecision is that some courts have taken the rule too
literally. A number of courts have relied on the rule of waiver and af-
firmed a judgment without any analysis of the merits of a multiplicity "'
or other double jeopardy claim.:... There are also a handful of courts
that have denied relief based on the rule of waiver despite finding a mer-
claim in Wilson was also meritless.
343. See, e.g., United States v. Jarvis. 7 F.3d 404, 409 (4th Cir. 1993) (reviewing
double jeopardy claim for plain error and treating cases applying the rule of waiver
as simply requiring an objection to be made before trial), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct.
1200 (1994).
344. See, e.g., United States v. Berry, No. 92-16647, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 9524. at
*3 (9th Cir. Apr. 20, 1994) (multiplicity claim waived because not raised before trial);
United States v. Connolly, No. 93-1625, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 31591, at *4 n.1 (1st
Cir. Dec. 7, 1993); United States v. Wilson, 983 F.2d 221, 225 (11th Cir. 1993) (same);
United States v. Colbert, 977 F.2d 203, 208 (6th Cir. 1992) (same); United States v.
Wilson, 962 F.2d 621, 626 (7th Cir. 1992) (same); United States v. Garrett, 961 F.2d
743, 748 & n.7 (8th Cir. 1992) (same); United States v. Mosley, 786 F.2d 1330, 1333
(7th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1184 (1986); see also United States v. Gerald,
624 F.2d 1291, 1300 (5th Cir. 1980) (declining to review claim raised for the first
time on appeal where there was no cause shown to grant relief from waiver), cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 920 (1981); United States v. Woods, 544 F.2d 242, 251 (6th Cir.
1976) (same), ccrt. denied, 429 U.S. 1062, and cert. denied, 430 U.S. 969, and cert.
denied, 431 U.S. 954 (1977).
345. See, e.g., United States v. Papadakis, 802 F.2d 618, 621 (2d Cir. 1986) (stating
that the defendant waived the contention that the second prosecution placed him in
double jeopardy because he raised it for the first time on appeal), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 1092 (1987); United States v. Bascaro, 742 F.2d 1335, 1365 (11th Cir. 1984) (sug-
gesting that a double jeopardy violation might exist, but refusing to reach it), cert.
denied, 472 U.S. 1017, and cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1021 (1985); United States v. Silva,
611 F.2d 78, 80 (5th Cir. 1980) (refusing to consider double jeopardy claim raised for
the first time on appeal); United States v. Conley, 503 F.2d 520, 521 (8th Cir. 1974)
(reversing conviction on other grounds); Cox v. Crouse, 376 F.2d 824, 826 (10th Cir.)
(per curiam) (habeas corpus case), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 865 (1967); Morlan v. Unit-
ed States, 230 F.2d 30, 32 (10th Cir. 1956) (double jeopardy claim waived because
not raised below); Miller v. United States, 41 U.S. App. D.C. 52, 62, (refusing to con-
sider double jeopardy claim not raised at trial), cert. denied, 231 U.S. 755 (1913);
United States v. Coy, 45 F. Supp. 499, 501 (W.D. Ky. 1942) (finding an implied waiver
of the defense where the defendant failed to raise the issue at trial); United States v.
Harrison, 23 F. Supp. 249, 252 (S.D.N.Y.) (holding that a guilty plea waives the dou-
ble jeopardy defense), offd, 99 F.2d 1017 (2d Cir. 1938).
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itorious double jeopardy claim. There has only been one such case decid-
ed in the past half century.:"'
It is apparent that a double jeopardy claim may be analyzed less care-
fully when the court believes that the claim has been waived. Where a
point is not deemed critical to the decision in a case it is likely to be
dealt with much differently than where an issue is perceived to be de-
terminative-illustrated by the courts' failure to fully analyze the rule of
waiver.
V. CONCLUSION
The apparent tension between the appellate courts' desire to enforce
the contemporaneous objection requirement and the unfairness of depriv-
ing a defendant of an absolute defense has resulted in considerable dis-
parity in the reported decisions. Doctrinal consistency and fairness to the
parties can be restored by discarding the rule of waiver and testing
claims of double jeopardy, like other types of error, under the rigorous
plain error standard. This is unlikely to diminish the number of meritori-
ous double jeopardy claims raised in the district courts. Counsel's re-
sponsibility to her client and the profession, in addition to the natural
desire to win the case, will ensure that the issue is raised as soon as it is
perceived. Accordingly, failure to raise a double jeopardy defense will
almost never be strategic.
The few meritorious double jeopardy claims raised for the first time on
appeal will ordinarily constitute plain error. As a result, defendants who
have been tried and found guilty by constitutionally sufficient evidence
will be entitled to reversal of convictions on jeopardy-barred counts. The
calculus of whether it is better to allow a possibly guilty person to go
free was originally decided by the framers of the Bill of Rights when they
chose to provide for assistance of counsel and freedom from double
346. See, e.g., Caballero v. Hudspeth, 114 F.2d 545, 547 (10th Cir. 1940) ("The two
counts of the indictment stating but a single offense, it follows that petitioner suf-
fered double jeopardy under the sentence of the court. The question of double jeop-
ardy may not, however, be raised by petitioner in the present proceeding."), overruled
by United States v. Broce, 753 F.2d 811 (10th Cir. 1985) on reh'g, 781 F.2d 792 (10th
Cir. 1986) (en banc), rev'd, 488 U.S. 563 (1989); Brady v. United States, 24 F.2d 399,
405 (8th Cir. 1928) (concluding that defendant waived meritorious double jeopardy
claim); Ochoa v. Estelle, 445 F. Supp. 1076, 1081 (W.D. Tex. 1976) ("The court con-
cludes that the sentence imposed by the second conviction is invalid because it vio-
lates double jeopardy. The court finds, however, that petitioner has waived that dou-
ble jeopardy claim by not asserting it prior to his second trial.").
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jeopardy. Thus, the only individuals who will go free after trial are those
who, under the Constitution, never should have been tried in the first
place.
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